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ABSTRACT 
 
New Urbanism has been described as an urban design movement promoting the master planning 
and development of communities that have walkable, human-scale neighborhoods while 
integrating the necessary elements of modern life such as vehicular traffic and parking, wide-
ranging retail offerings, and diverse employment centers.  As its core, New Urbanism attempts to 
counter the multitude of problems stemming from the rise of automobile transport and resulting 
mass migration to the suburbs in the 20th Century, including sprawl, a lost sense of local 
community, lack of diversity, untenable housing and transportation costs, arduous commuting 
times, negative environmental impacts, and harmful effects to individuals’ physical health. 
 
There have been a number of smaller – “town-scale” – New Urbanist developments built since 
the movement gained traction and formal organization in the 1980s.  These communities have 
proved their mettle not only as positive social engineering experiments, but also as profitable 
business models for real estate entrepreneurs.  The context for New Urbanism has changed 
greatly over the past several decades.  Today, design and development firms are undertaking the 
construction of secondary cities and urban nodes with housing units numbered in the tens of 
thousands and areas measured in hundreds of acres.  These “city-scale” developments carry risks 
and uncertainties that eclipse the rather controllable and largely foreseeable nature of small town 
development by requiring exponentially larger amounts of capital over periods typically 
extending more than a decade.  The phasing in of the wide array of product types call for clear 
vision, steady leadership, and stalwart relationships, despite the real challenges of fickle political 
support, unpredictable economic cycles, and increasingly opportunistic labor pools. 
 
The thesis will primarily focus on Miasteczko Wilanόw, a master planned community in 
southern Warsaw, Poland.  Supplemental research, through comparisons to Kentlands, Maryland 
and Pinehills, Massachusetts, will be presented.  Through on-site interviews and analysis of 
historical documentation, the thesis will aim to 1) present the initial considerations and intentions 
of Miasteczko Wilanόw; 2) chart the development’s progress and evolution from ground-
breaking to present day; and 3) present conclusions and potential solutions towards better 
planning and implementation of similar “city-scale” projects.  
 
Thesis Supervisor: Dennis Frenchman 
Title: Leventhal Professor of Urban Design and Planning
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Chapter 1   Introduction to Miasteczko Wilanόw 
The name “Miasteczko Wilanόw” literally translates into Wilanόw Village.  It is a relatively new 
master-planned community located in the southern part of Warsaw, eight kilometers south of the 
city center (Śródmieście).  As recently as the year 2000, the 169 hectares, upon which 
Miasteczko sits, were greenfields.  The land had been held for decades by a national agricultural 
university and although many uses were envisioned for the tract through the years, zoning 
changes were never authorized and it remained barren fields overgrown with wild grass. 
 
A series of events in the 1990s – initiated by Warsaw city leaders and accelerated by capitalistic 
builders – set in motion the course for a large-scale development at the site.  Today, Miasteczko 
is home to roughly 20,000 people that have chosen it for its convenient location, high quality of 
life, appealing contemporary architecture, and integration of many everyday necessities into a 
safe, walkable, and sophisticated community.  The developers’ aim from the beginning was to 
deliver on the principles of New Urbanism, while tailoring the design to respect the historical, 
cultural, and ecological characteristics of its specific location.  A walk through the neighborhood 
reveals many of its successes, evoking terms such as multi-generational, human-scale, 
ecologically-responsible, and vibrant.  In the background, cranes and dump trucks continue to 
operate during regular business hours reminding one that Miasteczko is still only 60% 
completed, with the vast majority of retail, office, and public-use offerings yet to come.  It is 
estimated that the development will require another five to six years to reach fully built-out 
status. 
 
 Wilanόw Palace & fields (2000) Wilanόw rendering, at completion 
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Despite its numerous accomplishments, Miasteczko Wilanόw’s journey to this point has been far 
from an easy one.  As with any project or career that nearly spans a generation, there have been 
internal ups and downs, as well as plenty of external factors that have proven particularly 
challenging for the greater vision of the community.  Meanwhile other subplots within the 
project have certainly lent themselves more to a television soap opera than a world class 
development.  There were many instances in which precarious political alliances, short-sighted 
investment groups, and the far-reaching effects of the global financial crisis nearly turned 
Miasteczko into a self-fulfilling prophesy.  For these reasons, chief planner and development 
advisor Guy Perry submitted Miasteczko Wilanόw to the Urban Land Institute as an entry for its 
prestigious Award For Excellence in 2010.  It was, in Perry’s own words, “a need to pull the 
project back together” that led to the submission – a reason for the individual stakeholders to 
leave behind their differences and unite for the greater good.  That year brought an 
unprecedented amount of cooperation as the ULI committee put Miasteczko under the 
microscope through the various stages of its competition. 
 
The Urban Land Institute saw through the turmoil in the end and viewed Miasteczko Wilanόw 
for what it was: the embodiment of new urbanist principles, a tour de force of contemporary 
architecture, an incredible achievement of cooperation from many disparate development groups, 
and a resounding financial success.  Perhaps most importantly, the award to Miasteczko was 
meant to serve as a precedent of smart growth in burgeoning emerging markets across the globe: 
an immediate example that reasonable density can be combined with mixed uses and 
environmental considerations to produce strong profits. 
 
This study attempts to document the various forces at play in the planning, development, and 
evolution of Miasteczko Wilanόw.  In the process, this report will try to dissect the successes and 
shortcomings of the project, while providing two other large-scale mixed-use developments as 
comparables.  It will conclude with recommendations and solutions to address similar challenges 
with future city-scale, new urbanist developments. 
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1.1 Relevance and Purpose of the Development 
It is difficult to sum up Poland’s history in a few paragraphs.  One could postulate that great 
novels, movies and academic careers have been dedicated to the subject, and still they fall short 
of explaining the many influences at play since the nation’s founding over a thousand years ago.  
On the one hand, Poland’s rich cultural heritage in the arts is seen in the numerous international 
accolades bestowed on its composers, poets, and writers.  The ground-breaking discoveries by its 
scientists, astronomers, and intellectuals have had profound impacts on the greater body of 
technical knowledge.  The nation’s ties to democracy dates back to the American and French 
revolutions, in which top Polish military minds strategized and fought in the efforts to overthrow 
self-serving monarchies. 
 
On the other hand, Poland has experienced incredible tragedy over its history and even today 
continues to have an identity crisis with its western allies.  It is a country that has twice 
disappeared off the world map, falling to marauding and conspiring neighbors when its nascent 
freely-elected governments and democratic ideals threatened the very core of its enemies’ 
regimes.  Poland lost a sixth of its population in the Second World War, and its land was the site 
of many of the most abhorrent atrocities of the last century.  Although its armed forces served 
under Allied Command and were victorious in toppling fascism in Europe, the nation was 
effectively surrendered to Russian imperialism at the Treaty of Yalta.  Even after battling and 
emerging from Communism, joining the NATO alliance, and subsequently being accepted as a 
European Union member, Poland is often mistakenly called an Eastern European country – a 
clear reference to its Soviet Bloc past – even though the country sits at the center of the 
continent. 
 
 Aerial photographs of Warsaw, Poland in 1935, 1948 and 2010, respectively 
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All this is to acknowledge that there were and continue to be many emotional factors 
surrounding the planning, design, and construction of Miasteczko Wilanόw.  Most pressing was 
the need for the development to be a definitive move away from the characterless communist 
block housing littering many of the country’s urban landscapes.  Simultaneously, it couldn’t be 
so modern as to render irrelevant the historical significance of its specific Wilanόw location.  
From the start, Miasteczko was meant to be a precedent for mixed-use building not only in 
Warsaw, but greater Poland, and perhaps even the whole of emerging Europe.  
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1.2 The Context: Warsaw Poland 
Warsaw is the largest city in Poland (38 million inhabitants), and is the ninth largest city in the 
EU by population.  It has 1.7 million residents, and its greater metropolitan area numbers 2.6 
million people.  Warsaw lies on the Vistula, one of the few remaining wild rivers of Europe, and 
is equidistant from the Baltic Sea to the north and the Carpathian Mountains to the south.  It is 
one of several major cities in Poland: Krakόw (1.3 million residents), Łόdż (1.2 million), Gdańsk 
(1.1 million), Poznań (1.0 million), Wrocław (1.0 million), and Szczecin (0.9 million).  Upper 
Silesia, which is comprised of ten different cities including Katowice (0.3 million), is Poland’s 
largest metropolitan area with roughly 2.7 million residents. 
 
 
 
 
In 1992, the newly democratically-elected Council of Warsaw (chief city legislative body) 
adopted the “Greater Warsaw Development Plan”, which sought to reorganize the city’s zoning 
and development guidelines to facilitate capital investment in real estate projects.  This had 
several major impacts on the eventual site of Miasteczko Wilanόw.  First, it allowed the 
expansion of Warsaw’s formal borders from the original seven central districts in 1994 to all 
eighteen districts of greater Warsaw by 2002.  The District of Wilanόw, which always 
considered itself part of Warsaw despite its autonomous town government and budget, was hence 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Warsaw city legislature.  Second, the Council of Warsaw saw 
Map of Poland Districts of Warsaw 
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to it that each district kept its own administrative body so that a local level of representation 
remained intact and directly answerable to its immediate constituency.  Third, the city approved 
large-scale zoning changes that created a development belt extending southward from the 
traditional city center to the outer-lying towns of Konstancin and Piaseczno.  This was meant to 
direct much-needed residential construction to the most sensible, buildable locations, as seen by 
city planners.  As the District of Wilanόw was right along this southern band, the long-held 
parcel by the university could now be recast as a new development property and sold to private 
parties. 
 
 
 
 
Location and boundaries of Miasteczko Wilanόw in red, relative to greater Warsaw 
(Royal Route is also denoted by yellow dotted line from Royal Castle to Wilanόw Palace) 
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The Greater Warsaw Development Plan was an attempt to spur growth and settlement to the 
south of the city’s center.  Whereas Wilanόw was historically a sparsely-populated farming 
community with vast, underutilized fields, it was now looking at the prospect of significant 
commerce growth from the waves of new Varsovians that would be relocating to populate its 
future communities.  To provide a means of comparison, Wilanόw was the fourth largest of 
Warsaw’s eighteen districts by land mass; however, it ranked last in terms of population and had 
by far the lowest density of all Warsaw districts at less than 500 persons per square kilometer.  
As stated by Andrzej Krzyspiak, vice-mayor of Wilanόw district council in the early-2000s, “we 
consider the (Miasteczko Wilanόw) project a model for the district’s growth…an area of 36.2 
square kilometers until only recently 15 percent zoned for development, now almost 80 percent 
rezoned for redevelopment.” (Perry, 2001) 
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1.3 Wilanόw Palace and the Royal Route 
Wilanόw may have been a sleepy farm town for most of its existence, but it was also steeped in 
culture and history due to its centuries-old ties to Poland’s nobility.  The formidable presence of 
Wilanόw Palace, directly to the site’s east, and the final stretch of the Royal Way, running along 
its northern boundary, demanded that the future development of Miasteczko Wilanόw be truly 
remarkable.  Although the Palace and Royal Route may have been considered marketing and 
sales points down the road, there was no doubt that the sensitive nature of these landmarks 
needed to be respected and worked into the greater feel and design of Miasteczko Wilanόw.  
 
 
 
Towards the end of the 17th century, Wilanόw Palace was built for Polish King Jan III Sobieski 
as a summer residence – like many other European manors – removed from Warsaw’s busy city 
center.  The estate is representative of baroque architecture and blends elements of French royal 
court and garden, Italian suburban villa, and Polish aristocratic mansion.  The interior of 
Wilanόw Palace is decorated with antiquities and tributes attesting to the grandeur of the royal 
family and King Sobieski’s significant military conquests.  Over the years, the palace has been 
owned by a number of Polish magnate families and statespersons, who have preserved the 
historical integrity of the property and opened the estate to the general public with a variety of 
cultural events, including classical music concerts and artwork displays.  Wilanόw Palace is 
considered a national treasure to the Poles; in 2006, it formally became a member of the 
European Royal Residences association. 
Wilanόw Palace & Gardens Nowy Świat, a section of Royal Route 
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The Royal Route, or Royal Way, is a lengthy line of boulevards that commence at the heart of 
Warsaw’s Old City and conclude at Wilanόw Palace (please refer to map on page 10).  The 
approximately 15-kilometer long route is yet another archetype from Poland’s regal past, lined 
with classically designed landmarks of royal, aristocratic, academic, and cultural significance.  
Beginning at the first avenue, Krakowskie Przedmieście showcases the Royal Castle, Castle 
Square, historical churches, and other landmarks. 
  
 
 
The next avenue, Nowy Świat, is lined with old world street cafes and restaurants interspersed 
with national museums and exquisitely restored parliamentary buildings.   
Wilanόw Palace Wilanόw Gardens, painted in 1777 
Castle Square Krakowskie Przedmieście, aerial view 
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The route then turns into Ujazdowskie Avenue, which runs through the historical church and 
luxury retailers of Place of Three Crosses Place as well as several art and military museums.   
   
 
 
The boulevard next turns into Bewederska, a tree-lined avenue with the presidential residence of 
Belwedere and the exquisitely manicured parks of Łazienkowski.  
  
 
Nowy Świat shops & storefronts Staszica Palace on Nowy Świat 
Place of Three Crosses Architecture of Ujazdowskie 
Presidential Estate of Bewedere Palace on the Water – Łazienki Park 
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The route continues south as Jana Sobieskiego through the District of Mokotόw before bending 
east as Aleja Wilanowska and coming upon Wilanόw Palace. 
 
  
Myslewicki Palace - Łazienki Park Chopin Monument - Łazienki Park 
Monument to King Jan III Sobieski Sielecki Park - Mokotόw 
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Chapter 2   Procurement of the Site 
The land, upon which Miasteczko Wilanόw sits, had been held for decades by SGGW (Warsaw 
School of Agriculture), even though it wasn’t utilized for any specific purpose during that time.  
Under Soviet control, the site was intended to be used as a Communist Party resort since at least 
the 1950s; however, the necessary building permits were never attained by hopeful bureaucrats.  
The passage of the Greater Warsaw Development Plan in 1992 was the first government action 
that conjured any real development at the site.  Soon after the legislation was enacted, initial 
planning studies were conducted for the Wilanόw area.   
 
 
 
In late 1995, city authorities announced a nationwide planning competition, based on the 
preliminary studies’ recommendation that development should be concentrated in the area 
delineated by the three main access roads of Wilanowska (from Royal Route east to Wilanόw 
Palace), Klimczaka (a east-west  boulevard through the center of current Miasteczko), and 
Krόlewska (a north-south thoroughfare also cutting though Miasteczko).  Polish design firm, 
DJiO, won the competition and began planning work on the eastern half of Miasteczko (directly 
across from Wilanόw Palace and Gardens) in 1997.  Soon afterwards, design firm BPRW 
commenced work on the land that is currently the western part of the development and 
accelerated the planning of the area.  It was at this point that several new business entities 
emerged as the new proprietors and advisors that would shape and fulfill the vision of what 
would become Miasteczko Wilanόw.   
 
  
Wilanόw fields, before construction 
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2.1 Parties of Interest 
SGGW had been trying to sell its Wilanόw land parcel for several years, even through the City of 
Warsaw-commissioned studies and planning work.  In the late 1990s, a Polish company by the 
name of Prokom Group initiated a series of negotiations with the college and district 
government.  Prokom’s real estate subsidiary, Energobudowa, had successfully built a few 
smaller residential projects in Poland’s major cities and it was exploring the possibility of a 
gated-community development in Warsaw.  In 1999, a settlement was reached and the company 
became owner of 169 hectares of SGGW’s land holdings.   
 
For Prokom, this was a bold move into unchartered territory given the unprecedented size and 
strategic location of the parcel.  Perhaps more importantly, the company had very limited 
experience in large-scale real estate development, as was the case with most builders in Central 
Europe at the time.  At its core, Prokom Group was an investment vehicle for K.R. (name 
withheld), a former military official described as “a serial entrepreneur” in the newly liberated 
and capitalistic Poland.  An early endeavor for K.R. was in the pharmaceuticals industry.  
Although not an engineer, he started a company that was successful in creating a new 
formulation of insulin on an industry-wide scale.  The entity, Bioton, was extremely profitable 
and its subsequent offering on the Warsaw Stock Exchange generated a massive profit for K.R.  
Meanwhile, another Prokom subsidiary was producing proprietary software for the Polish 
defense and intelligence ministries, government sectors in which K.R. had extensive 
relationships.  Suffice to say that Prokom was no stranger to diversification.  K.R. was now 
looking to pursue yet another significant but uncorrelated opportunity: the growing real estate 
market in the south of Warsaw. 
 
Prokom paid roughly $110 million for the Wilanόw site, using some of the proceeds from the 
Bioton IPO as well as a loan from a Polish commercial bank for the remaining 75% of the 
purchase price.  The job of leading the development project fell to Zbigniew Okoński, a top 
ranking official at Prokom that by his own admission had an undefined role at the company up to 
that point.  According to Okoński, K.R. basically told him: “ok, this is now your role, figure it 
out.”  Okoński was, in any case, extremely well-suited to lead Prokom’s newly formed real estate 
group.  He had studied economics at the University of Gdańsk and business administration at 
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Michigan State University.  He had previously served as Poland’s Minister of Defense in Lech 
Walesa’s cabinet and had already led several other new enterprises in the country’s nascent 
capitalistic economy. 
 
K.R.’s initial idea was to subdivide the Wilanόw land and resell the smaller plots as quickly as 
possible.  K.R.’s short-term approach to monetizing investments worked with his past startups 
and he hoped Prokom would be equally successful in Wilanόw.  However, Okoński quickly 
realized that no homebuilder would want to buy small plots in a tract of this magnitude.  Besides, 
he knew that attaining the zoning changes was absolutely necessary to make the parcels saleable 
to other builders.  Additionally, there was no way the District of Wilanόw authorities would 
grant approvals to a master plan that didn’t respect and incorporate the cultural significant of the 
neighboring Palace, Gardens, and Royal Route.  Furthermore, Prokom suffered from a lack of 
knowledge in large-scale community development and it simply didn’t have the financial means 
to drive a project of this size on its own.  The Wilanόw strategy needed to be reconsidered as it 
was beginning to look more and more like a multi-year, billion dollar project.  By this time 
Prokom was already exploring other options and making inroads with some of the top real estate 
advisory firms in the world. 
 
In 1999, Prokom hired TrizecHahn (TZH) as its chief planning and development advisor.  TZH 
Founder and President Peter Munk introduced Okoński to Guy Perry late that year, and thus 
began the business relationship that would produce the vision, design standards, and leadership 
for Miasteczko Wilanόw over the next decade.  Guy Perry was Senior Vice President at TZH and 
had a formidable resume entering this project: dual architecture and planning degrees from 
Harvard’s Graduate School of Design; early career work under world-renowned architect 
Ricardo Bofill (Barcelona Olympics; the Antigone district of Montpelier, France; SWIFT 
headquarters in Brussels); seven years in a global advisory capacity for Kajima Corp; numerous 
presentations on smart growth before the United Nations, MIPIM, ULI, and other international 
bodies; an Emmy Award for a Smithsonian Institute documentary; and numerous design awards, 
including two for his redevelopment of the Palma de Mallorca port, one of which was leading a 
Harvard University group of graduate design students.  It was his strict adherence to sustainable 
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building and New Urbanist principles that proved most instrumental for the future of Miasteczko 
Wilanόw. 
 
 
 
 
  
S.W.I.F.T. Headquarters - Brussels Antigone District - Montpellier, France 
INEF – Barcelona Olympics Corvin Setany - Budapest 
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2.2 The Goals 
Guy Perry began by coordinating the existing planning work into a greater scheme of a self-
supporting mixed-use development.  By that time, a newly privatized state agency, BPRW, had 
taken DJiO’s ground work and advanced it to near permitting status.  Perry left the scale and 
organizational features of DJiO and BPRW’s plans intact, but defined the programmatic and 
phasing elements for the first time.  Of significance, he was successful in changing K.R.’s 
mindset by showing how Miasteczko could be much more profitable if the emphasis was shifted 
toward a long-term rollout of a greater integrated community.  What Poles truly desired, he 
explained, was a mid-sized town that would incorporate the various elements of residential, 
retail, office, and community facilities on one site.  His vision was one that harkened back to the 
beauty of pre-war Warsaw: a mid-rise city of tree-lined streets and classic architecture that 
historians likened to a Paris of Central Europe.  It was this Warsaw that was leveled in the 1940s 
and replaced by Communist central planners’ monolithic designs and vast barren spaces devoid 
of any character.  Guy Perry argued that it was nonsensical to repeat the mistakes of the past by 
throwing buildings up simply to meet short-term goals.  Rather, this was an opportunity to create 
a truly unique development in line with the ideals of old Warsaw.   
 
Perhaps most importantly, Perry viewed the construction of a New Urbanist development as the 
perfect expression of democracy and this was what was vitally needed in Poland.  In his mind, 
Poles had battled Communist repression for years and now in the haste of capitalistic success, the 
wealthy were once again separating themselves from the masses with high gates and private 
communities. A simple reallocation of power – in this case, money – was causing a new 
generation to repeat the same mistakes once again.  However, a new urbanist development, with 
its mix of uses, generations, social classes, and income levels, kept everyone involved with the 
community.  The focus in new urbanism was not on the dividing walls, but on making the streets 
everyone’s business.  It represented individualism, civic involvement, inclusivity, and mutual 
respect. 
 
Finally, Perry’s own multi-cultural background was very influential in his approach to 
Miasteczko.  Being of both French and American descent, Perry grew up in the suburbs of Saint 
Louis, Missouri, and travelled each summer with his mother to her native Nancy, in the northeast 
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of France.  Nancy, itself, had a significant historical relationship to Poland.  In the early 18th 
century, exiled Polish King Stanisław’s was granted the Duchy of Lorraine by his son-in-law 
Louis XV.  The capital city, Nancy, had seen significant damage through several wars and 
 Stanisław immersed himself in its reconstruction with many leading French artists and 
architects.  Under his guidance, some of finest squares in all of Europe were built in Nancy, 
eclipsing even the beauty and harmony of those in Paris.   
 
Perry was inspired by Nancy’s Place Stanislas from an early age, and certainly the irony was not 
lost on him: a Pole was responsible for some of the most beautiful urban design in all of France.  
Unfortunately, once he arrived in Warsaw he found that Poles were not only unaware of this fact 
but they were totally ambivalent to its cultural relevance.  In fact, Polish developers wanted to 
forge ahead and put a gated community of single-family homes directly across from some of 
Warsaw’s most exquisite architecture, the Wilanόw Palace and Gardens.  Changing the mindset 
of local developers was a challenge and a necessity.  Miasteczko was a unique site and Perry 
greatly desired to be a part of its development.  This was a major factor in his choosing to take 
on and stay with the development over the following decade. 
 
 
 
 
  
Panorama of Place Stanislas, Nancy, France 
Arc Héré - Nancy Fountain of Amphitrite - Nancy 
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2.3 The Case for Smart Growth 
Guy Perry’s American roots also made him plenty aware of the perils of building for the here 
and now.  In Saint Louis, as with many U.S. metropolitan areas, the affordable automobile – 
easy-to-attain and accessible to the masses – greatly altered the landscape of America in the 
middle of the 20th century.  Travel became convenient and location became less relevant.  The 
creation of the Interstate Highway System had the dual effect of facilitating national commerce 
and opening up the country to new residential and commercial settlements that had previously 
been concentrated around city centers.  Factories could now locate pretty much anywhere, no 
longer constrained to waterways and ports for shipment of materials and export of finished 
product.  Individuals were more than happy to buy into newly constructed subdivisions with 
cheap tract housing and spacious backyards.  Who would want to live in overcrowded and 
polluted inner cities when suburban utopia was for sale en masse?  The “American dream” of 
land ownership and freedom of movement was seemingly satisfied overnight.   
 
 
 
 
In the wake of the great exodus to the suburbs, U.S. urban centers were vacated and soon were 
facing a cataclysmic fate of their own.  Many cities could not afford to maintain their existing 
infrastructures with a diminished population and lower tax base.  Roads, parks, schools, and 
cultural offerings went by the wayside.  To boot, urban conflict brought on by racial strife, a 
controversial foreign war, a deep economic depression, and rampant unemployment further 
evacuated the remaining bits of life in formerly proud cities during the 1970s.  New York City 
nearly defaulted on its debt and was infamously derided as “murder capital of the world” during 
The suburbs of the mid-20th century, USA 
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the decade.  In a sense, suburbs became more than just a better alternative; they became the great 
escape from the crime, corruption, and bedlam rife across the U.S.’ inner cities. 
 
 
 
 
However, suburban life was an easy solution.  As with many quick fixes, it took some time to 
realize the problems inherent with the new way of American life.  The low density of 
subdivisions meant that the car became more than just a convenience to take care of basic 
everyday tasks – it was an absolute necessity.  As more people moved into the suburbs, the 
limited amount of roads that were used for shopping and work commutes became capacity 
constrained.  Furthermore, the lack of a truly coordinated central planning effort led to sprawl: 
single family housing developments in one location, office buildings and industrial complexes in 
another location, and retailers occupying any available space along the roadways between them.  
Traffic became the norm with an increasingly large part of the average day dedicated to 
transportation. 
 
The suburban model had numerous secondary issues as well.  Whether it was the Levittowns of 
the 1950s or the McMansions or the 1990s, there was little if any differentiation in the housing 
within the new subdivisions.  The result was a loss of identity across those communities.   
 
Alphabet City, NYC – 1970s South Bronx, NYC – 1984 
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Then there were the sustainability concerns, questioning if this was really the new way of life 
that would replicated for generations to come.  For one thing, suburbanites were not any 
healthier living in their single family homes.  As auto transport became the only way to get 
anything done, health standards declined as well: waistlines grew, hypertension set in, and the 
rate of diabetes and other chronic diseases skyrocketed. (Howard Frumkin, 2004)  Then there 
was the rising cost of living in such an individualistic, scattered manner.  High oil prices made 
car transportation more expensive.  Perhaps most importantly was the fact that the single family 
house was an incredibly energy inefficient, fossil fuel demanding structure. (Howard Frumkin, 
2004)  All of this suggested that the utopia that suburban America originally appeared to offer 
was conflicted and presented its own dilemmas.    
 
In answer, Guy Perry saw many of the answers in his French roots and familiarity with Western 
European cities.  “Europeans have long been leaders in shaping cities for the long term.  The 
cities, treasured by their residents and admired by people worldwide as integrated places to live, 
work, and play, use their resources efficiently and already have proven their longevity,” Perry 
posed.  “Planning policy throughout Europe today consistently follows the mixed-use, high-
density formula that has characterized European cities for centuries.  The reasons for this are: 1) 
Population Density: Density creates a dimension of social dynamism, interaction, and cohesion 
that is the exception rather than the norm in American cities. 2) Urban Culture: European cities 
remain the center of employment, culture, and power – and most people want to be close to 
them. 3) Preservation of the Countryside: Ecological issues have broad-based support because of 
perceived limitations of space and natural resources.  4) Transportation Infrastructure: Density in 
Tract housing – 1940s Tract housing – 1990s 
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Europe allows for transportation options that often are not viable in the low-density North 
American suburbs.” (Perry, 2001) 
 
In Wilanόw, Perry saw parallels to the Saint Germain-en-Laye neighborhood outside Paris that 
he became familiar with in his youth.  The Parisian suburb had a palace at the center of the town, 
much like Wilanόw.  He saw that context as a suitable model for the new Warsaw community, 
rather than disparate elements haphazardly thrown together across many U.S. metropolitan areas.  
“In Saint Germain-en-Laye, you got around on foot or by public transport.  In Saint Louis you 
couldn’t get anywhere except by car.” (Stephens, 2003) 
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2.4 Program 
With Guy Perry’s involvement in Miasteczko Wilanόw, it was established early on that the 
project would have an overriding New Urbanist philosophy that would draw on the numerous 
international developments he had worked on throughout his career: “A well thought-out project 
may create a more sustainable community, one which supports long term value through a careful 
mix of uses, humanly proportioned public spaces and safely conceived streets.  The needs and 
comforts of people who will soon find themselves in these surroundings is our foremost 
consideration.” (Ciemniewska, 2002) 
 
Opinion polls were conducted in the Wilanόw district inquiring into residents’ consumer and 
commercial needs, favorite ways to spend free time, and views on the evolving Miasteczko 
planning and design.  Evaluations of potential impacts on local ecological and historical sites 
were commissioned.  Traffic pattern studies, particularly focused on ways to extend the existing 
Royal Route access points down through the site, were carried out.  A program considering 
municipal transportation additions, including the possibility of a new tram line from Miasteczko 
to the Warsaw city center, was examined. 
 
In 2000, Guy Perry branched off and created a new design and development advisory firm, 
Investment Environments (“IN-VI”), to further his mission of creating sustainable community 
environments in emerging markets.  TrizecHahn was already beleaguered by extensive 
partnership difficulties with its “Eisenbahn” project in Frankfurt, Germany, and it was soon 
reevaluating its international platform, including its presence in Poland.  Through negotiations, 
IN-VI was able to take on the entire Miasteczko advisory role by the middle of the year. 
 
By autumn 2000, a master plan for the western and eastern parts of Miasteczko was submitted to 
the Wilanόw District Council.  The plan envisioned 2,000,000 square meters of total buildable 
space once completed divided across mixed-uses of multi-family, single-family, office/research, 
retail, private and public schools, government buildings, places of worship, and a hotel.  A 
significant part of the site was dedicated to green space, which should not have been unexpected 
given Perry’s mantra of incorporating existing plant life and waterways into developments:  
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“Plazas, canals, parks, and landscaping are the organizing features of the community – those 
common areas are the trademark of any world class city or neighborhood.”  (Perry, 2001) 
 
Additionally, a higher floor-area ratio (FAR) density of just under 2.0 would provide an easily 
walkable, pedestrian-friendly community.  Additionally, Miasteczko’s structures would have to 
meet two building regulations in its design and construction.  The first requirement was that a 
minimum of 50% of total land would have to be set aside and protected as biologically active 
areas.  The second involved residential building heights, specifically that the fourth floor of each 
housing complex would be set back at least one meter from the lower stories, and that only 50% 
of the highest fifth floor would be buildable.  The latter regulation was an outright attempt at 
social engineering as it forced developers to be creative in working top floor villas into their 
designs.  These rooftop villas would be critical to attracting a wealthy subset of the Warsaw 
population into the community, which in turn would elevate the prestige and marketability of the 
new development.  Furthermore, the overall height restriction of residential buildings would 
intentionally subjugate them as “role players” to Wilanόw’s “main stars” of the Palace & 
Gardens, Temple, and escarpment at the western border.   
 
Miasteczko would provide a higher concentration of multi-family residential buildings at the 
center of the site, which themselves would have retail and service offerings throughout their 
ground floors.  Each block would be built along the perimeter, leaving a common space at the 
center open to the elements and for private use of its residents.  The center courtyards would 
have vegetation, plant life, and typically a small playground for young children.  Each multi-
family building was also required to construct at least 1.5 underground parking spaces per 
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apartment unit to satisfy the goal of putting 90% of neighborhood vehicles in private residential 
garages. 
 
 
 
 
 Miasteczko Wilanόw master plan 
Miasteczko Wilanόw residential orientation 
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At the north-eastern end of the community directly across from Wilanόw Palace and Gardens, 
would be the new District of Wilanόw Town Hall, with a public square fronting the palace, 
creating an urban ensemble.  This would be a major upgrade of the existing government offices 
and serve as a testament that municipal representatives and officials are a real and prominent part 
of the new Wilanόw.  This area would also have several smaller plazas that could have 
secondary uses, such as a local farmers market and a public playground for children. 
 
 
 
 
On the eastern side of Miasteczko just south of the Town Hall would be a large and diverse retail 
center with: a Royal Plaza such as found in many European squares, a Water Plaza that would 
serve as a local meeting and gathering point, and a grand outdoor shopping plaza.  Importantly, 
this commercial area was intended to be a major shopping center not only for Miasteczko 
Wilanόw, but for the whole of southern Warsaw.  Retail options were sorely missing in the 
Wilanόw vicinity up to that point.  Many local residents had to travel considerable distances 
either into the city center or south to the outer-lying town of Konstancin to conduct everyday 
purchases.  For this reason, the retail plaza intended to satisfy a functional need and also be a 
landmark for the district in reflecting the status of the Palace.  Contemporary designs for 
storefronts were meant to engage and invite browsers into the shop. 
 
Miasteczko Wilanόw town center – rendering (left) & orientation (right in yellow) 
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The southern part of Miasteczko would be the employment center of the development with a mix 
of office, research, and medical facilities.  Since a future Warsaw ring-road, the A-2, was 
planned to cut through this section of Miasteczko, the design team strategically placed the office 
park there to 1) create a noise and pollution barrier for the rest of Miasteczko and 2) capitalize on 
the visibility and marketability of its future signature corporate offices from the highway.  
Furthermore, an office park with convenient highway access could potentially draw from the 
labor pool of nearby communities, in addition to its own local Miasteczko residents.  This 
commercial area would be a complement to the other residential and retail areas of Miasteczko, 
again accessible by foot and reflecting a contemporary style.  Talks were already underway to 
locate a top-ranked hospital to the site.  Additionally, some multi-family and high-end single 
family homes would be placed on the outskirts of this area.   
 
 
 
Miasteczko Wilanόw retail plaza – rendering (left) & orientation (right in orange) 
Miasteczko Wilanόw office park – rendering (left) & orientation (right in red) 
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The center and western side of the development were set aside for the core cultural institutions of 
new community: a place of worship, public elementary and high schools, and private 
international schools.  The most prominent building in this complex would be the National 
Temple of Divine Providence, located at the intersection of two main byways: Rzeczpospolita 
and Klimczaka.  Although the temple could be viewed as yet another shrine in the predominantly 
Catholic country, the 40-meter high structure goes far beyond being a singularly-focused place of 
worship.  Over 200 years ago, an idea was originally proposed for a national landmark that gave 
thanks to Poland’s first democratic Constitution.  The concept was revived in the early 1990s by 
Warsaw primate Cardinal Glemp and he specifically pushed for a Wilanόw location as the 
district was being repurposed by Warsaw’s city leaders.  At the time of this writing, the temple 
has taken on other meanings, including the celebration of Poland’s victory over Communism – 
an archenemy of the church throughout its regime – and the remembrance of the late Pope John 
Paul II.  Importantly, going forward all Polish Presidents will be laid to rest in the temple’s 
catacombs, entitled Pantheon of the Great Poles.  Already buried at the site is Poland’s last 
President in exile Ryszard Kaczorowski. 
 
 
 
The north-western part of Miasteczko was zoned for additional multi-family residential 
development.  However, it bears mention that this particular section was built into a conservation 
zone that had several ponds and a small lake.  The ecological sensitive nature of this parcel 
required construction of a canal around one building footprint.  IN-VI’s landscape architects 
were also able to craft two wooded parks in this area, one larger and one smaller.   
 
Miasteczko’s Temple of Divine Providence – rendering (left) & orientation (right in purple) 
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An escarpment runs north-south just beyond the western boundary of the development.  This 
provides an additional scenic feature to the development: a natural topographic incline densely 
populated with beech, oak and pine trees.  As this area is prone to erosion and flooding, it is 
protected as a conservation zone by the City of Warsaw.  The strip of land at its base, which is 
contained within the limits of Miasteczko Wilanόw, is wet and considered ecologically-sensitive 
as well.  The master plan denoted that this area be reserved for single-family housing that is 
designed and built in a fashion respectful of this environment. 
 
The Miasteczko Wilanόw master plan also set aside land for common spaces and recreational 
activities.  The thoroughfares of Royal Axis and Klimczaka would both lead to the Wilanόw 
Palace & Gardens while presenting landscaped canals and wide medians for walks, sports, and 
casual gatherings along their routes.  Every street in Miasteczko would have a separate sidewalk 
and bicycle path.  Just west of the temple and schools would be dedicated recreational grounds 
for soccer, tennis, and basketball.  An ice skating rink would find a home at the Royal Plaza, near 
the town hall.  Lastly, equestrian trails, which dated several centuries back to Poland’s nobility 
and ran from the stables of Wilanόw Palace to two other historical palaces situated at the top of 
the western escarpment, would be preserved as an important historical element of Wilanόw. 
 
 
 
 
Zoning approvals for IN-VI’s community-wide master plan were granted in January 2001 by the 
Council of Wilanόw.  The changes were subsequently registered with the City of Warsaw 
development authority that spring.  
Miasteczko’s commitment to green spaces and recreation 
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2.5 Phasing 
Prokom Group and Zbigniew Okoński envisioned that the Miasteczko Wilanόw development 
would be constructed over a ten to twelve year timeframe.  The total price of the entire project, 
once completed, was estimated at approximately one billion Euros.  It was acknowledged that 
other developers would have to be pulled in to realize the project.  Miasteczko was simply too 
large and expensive for a relatively new builder in an emerging market to complete on a solo 
basis.  By the time the master plan was submitted and ratified, Prokom had already been courting 
outside construction companies, including several major international developers, to purchase 
land parcels in the project. 
 
Guy Perry was satisfied with his new firm’s position as master planner of Miasteczko and he 
embraced IN-VI’s role as rule-maker and supervisory body for the subsequent design of 
individual project elements.  New investors wanted leeway to build according to their own 
designs and specifications, and Perry was happy to oblige.  “When they were building the most 
beautiful European cities there were very strict urban design guidelines and the architects 
collaborated to make sure the city was going to look coherent,” he stated.  “To me, it’s a 20th 
century notion that one firm designs these big projects.” (Stephens, 2003)  Going forward, Perry 
stressed innovation in the development’s build-out.  “We will purposefully be picking young 
architects who will have to live with what they do for the next 50 years,” he posed.  “It’s not 
about making an architectural statement but about making an appropriate building for the 
location near the Palace.”  (Stephens, 2003) 
 
As part of the land procurement and rezoning process, Prokom had also been talking with local 
authorities to obtain guarantees and concessions on public infrastructure needs.  The Council of 
Warsaw agreed to an arrangement whereby Prokom would build the public roads and service 
connections of the community, but would be repaid by the government over a long-term basis.  
This allowed Prokom to bridge the gap to needed land divestitures since new builders would not 
buy into the project without having basic services in place and operational.   
 
Furthermore, Prokom was able to reach a compromise for the future site of the Temple of the 
Divine Providence.  The company entered into a land swap with the Catholic Church, which 
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effectively was a tax write-off for the developer.  Much more importantly, the Church would 
assist Prokom in its efforts to attain zoning approvals on an expedited basis, something a private 
entity would not be able to do on its own in Poland’s bureaucratic environment.  One secured, 
planning and design for the cultural landmark could commence and serve as proof that the 
redevelopment of Wilanόw was underway.  It bears mention that an agreement with the church 
was significant for Prokom in two additional ways: 1) it pressured subcontractors to set up 
infrastructure in an expeditious manner since the temple was located at the center of the 169-
hectare site and not a single road or bit of public service had been run there yet; and 2) local 
politicians sought affiliation with the temple project since it ensured the positive opinion of the 
religiously-devout and patriotic constituency. 
 
In light of these developments, Prokom prepared for the first building phase.  Private 
construction activity would commence in the northeast – nearest Wilanόw Palace – with the new 
Town Hall, public plazas, and several multi-family residential buildings.  In the next phase, the 
outdoor shopping center would be constructed in addition to several multi-family structures 
uniting the temple site to the Palace.  As the project gained traction, other parts of the 
development would be gradually phased in.  The final stages of Miasteczko’s development 
would see the office park in the south and the single family homes along the western escarpment 
build-out. 
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Chapter 3   Project Development 
In retrospect, Zbigniew Okoński admitted that getting the rezoning and master plan approved in 
a year and a half timeframe was something close to setting “a world record”.  For one thing, this 
was Poland: a country with a nascent democratic system that had been mired in bureaucracy for 
decades.  The whole notion that the former farm town of Wilanόw was now part of the City of 
Warsaw was still very new and the dynamic forces at play were a culture shock to many.  
Second, it was difficult to get the entire Wilanόw District Council on the same page and see the 
greater vision that IN-VI, and now Prokom, were pursuing.  There were considerable trust issues 
given that other parts of Warsaw were being reconstructed rapidly, often unattractively, for 
short-term gain.  The citizens of Wilanόw were concerned about their bucolic fields and 
historical sites being swallowed up by new housing blocks.  Finally, there were outside agents 
already conspiring against the new master plan.  Two big commercial retail groups – Carrefour 
and Metro Group – were looking to advance their own shopping mall plans in the south of 
Warsaw.  They lobbied local officials to block the Miasteczko retail plaza, which they claimed 
would over-saturate the market and cause disaster for all.  Perry viewed the debate as something 
to akin to “a beauty contest” and appealed that the authorities “tame the big box mentality” by 
outright denying the hypermarkets the unattractive, fully-enclosed blueprints they sought to force 
on the community.  In the end, the Wilanόw Council sided with Miasteczko in only allowing one 
retail center in the entire district. 
 
To Okoński, those first two years were truly spent on solidifying key relationships for the 
following decade.  With approvals for the master plan in place, Prokom could now proceed with 
selling off pieces of the massive project to other developers.  Concurrently, Prokom agreed with 
the Wilanόw and Warsaw councils to commit another $50 million for the construction of power 
lines, water supply, rainwater drainage and sewers, and water treatment capacity.  Of important 
note, the company would actually have to build two separate water treatment plants as 
Miasteczko was built out: the first plant would temporarily serve the early buildings, while the 
second one would be centralized and capable of handling the entire development.  This 
duplicative effort significantly added to the costs and complexity of the project.  Okoński 
estimated that total cost of infrastructure improvements, implied value to lands surrendered to the 
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municipality, and interest on the purchase loan was in the $100-110 million range. 
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3.1 Successes and Challenges in the Early Years: 2001-2003 
By the end of 2000, Prokom had transferred land for the temple and had begun preliminary talks 
for the sale of two hectares adjacent to the temple to a German private school.  While neither of 
these actions were material monetarily, they did indicate that Miasteczko would be improving 
the cultural offerings of Wilanόw.  The following year brought a land sale that provided Prokom 
its first significant return on investment and established a new partnership structure that the 
master developer would replicate throughout Miasteczko. 
 
In mid-2001, Prokom sold an 8.4 hectare residential-zoned parcel, abutting the future town 
center and retail plaza sites, to Israel-based Robyg Development for roughly $20 million.  While 
the land claim (roughly 5% of Prokom’s total land) was sold outright to Robyg, the purchase 
agreement also created a new “venture for development” entity, in which Robyg would have 
51% control and Prokom would remain a 49% minority partner.  This is to say that Prokom sold 
the land free and clear to Robyg, but signed on to be half of the construction, financing, 
marketing, and sales company that would develop that parcel.   
 
This was a brilliant, if not self-serving, structure by Prokom.  In one transaction it was 
monetizing its land holding, reducing its balance sheet exposure, and signing on for 50% of the 
upside with rather limited downside on the subsequent building development and sale.  The 
benefit for Robyg was that Prokom facilitate building permitting through its established local 
relationships and familiarity with the master plan parameters.   Prokom would also finance half 
the development, although it could be argued that its funding requirements would be drawn from 
proceeds of Robyg’s land purchase as well as a construction loan.  The downside for Robyg was 
that if the development took longer than anticipated, it could be stuck holding a non-performing 
asset over an indeterminable timeframe.  If the project were to fail, then Robyg could potentially 
lose its Wilanόw parcel to creditors.  For Prokom, the downside was limited to the money it 
invested in the new construction project; it did not provide any other guarantees. 
 
From the capital investment perspective, Prokom’s return on the Robyg parcel was tremendous.  
(All numbers are kept at a constant US dollar-Polish Zloty exchange rate of 4.0 over this 
timeframe.)  Prokom bought the Wilanόw site at an average of $65 per square meter and 
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subsequently added roughly $25 per square meter in land improvements.  It sold the land to 
Robyg at approximately $250 per square meter.  Considering that Prokom borrowed 75% of the 
Miasteczko purchase price, the economics were tremendous over a relatively short two-year 
timeframe.  Not to mention that Prokom was still invested in this 8.4 hectare tract as a 49% 
development partner.  
 
To its credit, Robyg had the first residential building site at Miasteczko Wilanόw and was 
receiving plenty of press coverage as a result of it.  By autumn 2001, Robyg acquired 
construction permits for the site and planned an upscale contemporary multi-family building at 
the location.  The “Queen Marysieńska New Residence” was expected to house 1,300 new 
Miasteczko residents at completion.  The first 60-unit section of the building complex was to 
open by the end of 2003.  Robyg reported in February 2003 that 20% of the Queen Marysieńska 
project had been pre-sold; by July, the number jumped to 85%. (Wrobel, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Prokom quickly moved on similar land sale / development partnership agreements.  It entered 
into a joint venture agreement in the same 51% / 49% structure with Wilanόw Investments, a 
new real estate builder co-owned by Poland’s largest bank PKO.  This deal was for a comparably 
sized and priced residential plot next to Robyg’s parcel.  Exact terms and conditions were not 
offered. 
 
Queen Marysieńska Residence – rendering (left) & orientation (right in navy blue) 
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Soon afterwards, a contract was reached with the local subsidiary of Spain-based Fadesa Group 
for a more centrally located and considerably larger parcel.  With Fadesa Polska, Prokom 
secured the sale of 16 hectares north and west of the temple.  Okoński acknowledged that these 
negotiations were considerably tougher than the first two deals since it had a considerable area 
considered environmentally-sensitive.  As a result, Fadesa paid a lower rate than Robyg and 
Wilanόw Investments; the exact figure was undisclosed.  Eventually, 2.5 hectares of that parcel 
was set aside for two separate parks; one larger and heavily-wooded and the other smaller with a 
canal.   
 
 
 
 
The three residential land deals to Robyg, Wilanόw Investments, and Fadesa amounted to a sale 
of roughly 20% of Prokom’s total land holdings in Miasteczko, estimated at a total price of 
Fadesa’s “Ostoja Wilanόw” residences – rendering (left) & orientation (left in light blue) 
Wilanόw Investments residences –orientation (in green) 
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around $75 million. As mentioned earlier, Prokom conducted each transaction with the same 
51% / 49% equity split in the newly-formed development company partnerships. 
 
As for the commercially-zoned areas, Prokom reached a preliminary agreement with Auchan 
Polska, a subsidiary of the France-based shopping center owner-operator in late 2001.  The 
transaction was for the 14.8 hectares (8.7% of its Miasteczko holdings) directly across from the 
Wilanόw Palace and Gardens.  This placed the retail plaza’s fate in the hands of Auchan, an 
international developer of hypermarkets (big box retailers), supermarkets, and small specialty 
retailers.  Auchan’s plan for the commercial premises included roughly 100,000 square meters of 
total space, comprised of an 18,000 square meter anchor Auchan hypermarket, 150 additional 
shops, a winter garden, and 4,000 underground parking spots.  Auchan was in search of a foreign 
investor to co-development the retail town center throughout 2002, but the scale and cost of such 
a grand project, particularly in a new Central European market, made finding a suitable partner 
difficult. (Lemańska, 2007) 
 
At the same time, public concerns with the size and location of the big box retailer and greater 
commercial project started to come to the forefront.  Citizens groups organized and protested 
Auchan’s intentions in the press and petitioned various government authorities to stop the 
hypermarket.  Specifically, Wilanόw residents worried that the big box outlet and shopping plaza 
would destroy the historical and cultural character of the neighboring palace and gardens.  
Okoński admitted that a more concentrated effort should have been made to meet with those 
disparate parties and dispel their concerns directly.  He mentioned that the original commercial 
plans were quite respectful of the location but Prokom relied too much on the press as a means of 
countering the misinformation.   
 
Prokom and Auchan reexamined their plans and negotiated a compromise with the Warsaw 
building authorities to obtain the necessary permits in November 2003.  First, the size of the 
entire commercial district was reduced by 30% to 70,000 square meters.  Second, Auchan agreed 
to downscale its anchor hypermarket by a third to 12,000 square meters.  Third, Prokom 
guaranteed another $5 million investment towards infrastructure improvements in Wilanόw.  
Fourth, the developers promised to market the retail plaza under the name and theme of historic 
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Wilanόw, eschewing the growing trend of brand-driven namesakes.  Finally, Prokom agreed to 
build a world-class mammography center elsewhere at the Miasteczko site.  Although this last 
concession was admittedly totally unrelated, the Warsaw authorities were looking 
opportunistically to conjure a public good while answering other critics’ complaints about the 
lack of modern healthcare facilities in the capital.  Auchan and Prokom both appeared set to 
begin construction in the middle of 2004. (Wilanów Town - A Step Forward, 03) 
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3.2 Success, Hubris, and the Global Financial Crisis: 2004-2008 
By 2004, Miasteczko was visibly coming together.  Work had begun on the temple at the center 
of the development and the first residential buildings that would ring the town hall, public plazas 
and outdoor retail strips were up and welcoming their first residents.  The offices at Robyg, 
Wilanόw Investments, and Fadesa were busy and accepting apartment downpayments at faster-
than-expected rates.  The concept of a large-scale, mixed-use development in the south of 
Warsaw appeared to be a major financial success.  Prokom was profiting handsomely on its 
initial land purchase and subsequent developers were registering price points at the top end of 
Warsaw’s residential market.   
 
 
 
Soon, new developers were coming into the mix in pursuit of their own residential and office 
projects.  In 2005, Israel Land Development Company (ILDC) entered Poland through its new 
local subsidiary, Mill-Yon.  It bought seven hectares without entering into a partnership 
arrangement with Prokom.  The complex, titled “Aura Park”, targeted the construction of 1,000 
apartments across eight buildings.  Units would range from 46 to 146 square meters and list at 
PLN 6,000-7,500 per square meter.  Aura Park would be built over four stages starting in 2006. 
(PMR, 06) 
 
Temple (left) and Robyg (right) construction 
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A Polish bank, BRE, purchased three hectares in Miasteczko in 2006 and formed a real estate 
entity, Skarbiec TFI, to co-develop with Prokom.  The residential complex, named “Wilanόw - 
Królewskie Przedmieście” (Wilanόw – The Royal Suburb), sought to build 430 apartments in 
two stages over a three-year period.  "The prices of flats depend on numerous factors and will 
range from PLN 4,740 to PLN 7,900 per sqm," Skarbiec President Andrzej Bartnik said at the 
time to the purchase. (WBJ, 2006) 
 
 
 
In 2008, Acciona Nieruchmości, the local subsidiary of the Spain-based developer, purchased 3.4 
hectares directly east of the temple for an undisclosed sum.  Its residential complex, entitled 
“Apartamenty Atmosfera” (Apartment Atmosphere), planned to deliver 258 apartments, 592 
underground parking spots, and 1,640 sqm of retail space in its first stage by end 2010.  
Apartment units would range in the PLN 6,900-11,100 band, while parking spaces would be 
offered at PLN 13,400 each. (Zdrodowski, 2008) 
Mill-Yon’s Aura Park – rendering (left) & orientation (right in orange) 
Skarbiec sketch 
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Hines Interests also entered Wilanόw around the same timeframe.  It planned its own seven 
residential buildings named “Impresja Apartments” on roughly four hectares overlooking the 
Royal Axis.  The complex would construct 290 units and a 464-car underground garage, in 
addition to ground floor retail. 
 
 
 
On the commercial side, Skanska announced its own intentions in May 2004.  The Scandinavian 
building giant had purchased a 3.8 hectare plot at the eastern entrance to Miasteczko, within the 
retail plaza area.  It planned two office mid-rises, at roughly 13,000 sqm each, and a 4-star hotel 
at the site.  Skanska expected to commence construction the following year and conclude the first 
building by the end of 2006. (WBJ, 2004) 
 
International developers snapped up the residential parcels and their new apartments sold very 
well to Warsaw’s emerging middle class.  Land, which was originally purchased by Prokom at 
$65 per sqm in 2001, was changing hands at roughly $500 per sqm by 2007.  Even the 
Acciona’s Apartamenty Atmosfera – rendering (left) & orientation (right in brown) 
Hines’ Impresja sketch 
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commercial side seemed to gaining traction with Auchan attaining retail building permits and 
international heavyweight Skanska joining the development.  However, not all was right in 
Wilanόw.  Several serious issues emerged during this timeframe that would have long-lasting 
implications for the greater development of Miasteczko, specifically in regards to its phasing.   
 
The first of these was exposed by leading Polish newspaper, Rzeczpospolita (The Republic), in 
mid-2004.  Rzeczpospolita ran an investigative piece on an emerging corruption scandal 
involving the former deputy mayor of the Wilanόw District and Turkish construction company 
Deniz.  The article uncovered that the government official had accepted a $30,000 bribe from the 
builder in exchange for his assistance to help Deniz win the new Town Hall project in 
Miasteczko.  The payment occurred in August 1999 and the contract award was announced in 
2000.  Additionally, the same official had signed over two hectares of prime Miasteczko property 
in August 2002 at no cost to Deniz.  The newspaper implied money laundering and tax evasion 
activity as the deputy mayor was paid repeatedly by Deniz as a “construction advisor”, despite 
no publically-known role at the firm.  At the printing of the story, the individual had ascended to 
the position of mayor in Wilanόw, which served to further damage Miasteczko’s reputation.  
(WBJ, 2004) 
 
Seeing a potentially crippling investigation on the horizon, Deniz evacuated the half-finished 
town hall and office buildings.  The mayor of Wilanόw was soon indicted, sentenced, and 
imprisoned.  Polish authorities subsequently fined Deniz several million Euros for failing to 
complete the town hall on time, which was really an administrative reaction meant to hasten the 
unwinding of Deniz’ contracts.  In the U.S.’ well-developed and functioning bankruptcy system, 
the courts would have declared a default and accelerated the asset recovery process.  Conversely, 
Poland’s nascent legal system left a question mark over the properties and placed them in 
judicial limbo for the foreseeable future.  It did not help that Deniz’ joint partner in this specific 
project was the City of Warsaw.  Bureaucratic finger-pointing ensued, followed shortly thereafter 
by intransigence.  The buildings were left as steel and concrete carcasses, directly across the 
boulevard from the historical palace and gardens. 
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With building licenses in hand, Auchan also appeared positioned to commence construction of 
the retail plaza in 2004.  However, finding commercial investment partners proved to be very 
difficult.  For one thing, potential partners were concerned about recent permitting difficulties in 
Wilanόw and the chance that the emboldened historical preservation society, local environmental 
groups, and citizen action committees could once again present development delays.  The town 
hall scandal left the project across the street as another major question mark; the deserted 
building quickly became a graffiti-littered eyesore, further repelling potential retail partners. 
Perhaps most importantly, the whole concept of an outdoor shopping plaza did not fit easily into 
mindset of many European retail developers for Central Europe.  Many were set in their ways of 
producing fully-enclosed indoor malls, reminiscent of the regional mall model built throughout 
the U.S. in the latter half of the 20th century.  Although “the mall” had been scrapped decades 
earlier in the U.S. in favor of more natural walkable outdoor shopping villages, the idea was a 
tough sell in Central Europe, even though there was no shortage of evidence supporting its better 
economics and longer-term sustainability.  For one thing, the most successful shopping plaza – 
as measured by retail sales and rental rates – in Poland was Galeria Mokotόw, situated in a 
neighboring district of south Warsaw and no more than 10 kilometers from the Miasteczko site.  
Mokotόw was a massive upscale indoor mall built in the late 1990s, similar in style to Natick 
Collection in Massachusetts.  Despite its nondescript design, the mall benefitted tremendously 
from its location in a very densely populated area of Warsaw, its proximity to multiple public 
transportation lines, and the lack of competing shopping venues near its vicinity.  Furthermore, a 
brand new 205,000 sqm indoor shopping, entertainment, and office center, “Złoty Terasy” 
The deserted Town Hall project 
48 
 
(Golden Terraces), was undergoing construction right in the center of Warsaw at an estimated 
cost of 500 million Euros.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guy Perry continued to reiterate the many advantages of the outdoor plaza in the local press.  He 
cited Easton Town Center in Columbus, Ohio as a prime example of an outdoor retail that could 
thrive in a winter climate harsher than Warsaw. “When Steiner (co-developer of the project) was 
looking for financing (in the 1990s) he couldn’t get any.  People thought he was nuts to put 
shops outside,” Perry stated.  “Now it’s driving the highest rents (in the state of Ohio).”  Still, 
investors were slow to sign on to Auchan’s plans and the start date for the retail plaza 
construction languished. (Stephens, 2003) 
 
In another blow to the town center development, Skanska pulled out of its office and hotel 
project in the middle of 2008.  The Scandinavian builder sold its 3.8 hectare parcel to Canada-
based Capital Park for €11.4 million, booking a €9.1 million gain over its four-year holding 
period.  Despite the attractive profit, Skanska remained unhappy with the direction of 
Miasteczko and voiced its concerns to the press.  “We are selling these building rights because 
the Wilanόw area is turning into a residential area with elements of retail.  That is outside our 
Galeria Mokotόw shopping mall 
Złoty Tarasy shopping mall, city center Warsaw 
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focus, which is developing commercial premises with a high environmental profile.  In recent 
years, the price of building rights in Poland has developed strongly and we will receive excellent 
returns from the sale of the land, which we acquired in 2004,” said Lars Vardheim, president of 
Skanska Commercial Development Europe, in a press release.  For its part, the new owners 
acknowledged the difficulties in deflecting the criticism. “We’d like to create an alternative to 
the dominant residential function of the area,” stated Artur Pietraszewicz, Director of Capital 
Park Marketing and Sales.  “A critical mass of residential development has now been reached in 
Wilanόw, so it’s going to need some complementary functions.” (CiJ, 2008) 
 
Yet another drag on Miasteczko’s timely roll-out of product types involved the lead developer 
Prokom.  The company was experiencing phenomenal success with Miasteczko, but its 
investments were largely concentrated in the one Wilanόw project.  Prokom desired to diversify 
within the booming Polish property development market and it viewed a complementary merger 
with another engineering or construction company as the quickest way to achieve that goal.  By 
2004, Prokom Group had built a substantial stake (31% equity interest) in fellow Polish builder, 
Polnord SA.  Although the companies had held discussions about combining their development 
efforts several times in the past, both finally to merge in the mid-2000s.  The agreement was as 
follows: Prokom Group (the parent company of development subsidiary Energobudowa) would 
put all of its real estate activities and investments, including all Miasteczko Wilanόw holdings, 
into Polnord.  In exchange, Prokom would receive 51% of Polnord’s equity and account for it as 
a passive financial investment.  Going forward, Polnord would manage all of Prokom’s former 
real estate operations, including the build-out of Miasteczko. 
 
The initial proposal took about three years to pass through shareholder and regulatory approvals.  
By 2007, the agreement was finalized and the new master developer of Miasteczko Wilanόw was 
Polnord SA.  According to Okoński, the merger allowed Prokom to “gain critical mass…it was 
nothing (short of) success.”  Polnord’s share price rose from PLN 30 before the proposed link-up 
to over PLN 320 afterwards.  The merged company was now an industry titan and ranked 
amongst the top twenty companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange by valuation.  Polnord was 
awash in cash and K.R. was now a billionaire.  However, there were major problems with 
Miasteczko that were overlooked, if not ignored, as a result of the drawn-out merger process.  
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The retail plaza and the city center continued to show no progress during those years.  The focus 
was diverted to capital gains rather than an orderly completion to Miasteczko. 
 
Okoński felt that the former Prokom was a much changed company by 2007.  K.R. lost his desire 
to complete the city center and instead gravitated towards the simplicity of the residential 
development partnership model.  Additionally, K.R. adopted more of the go-it-alone strategy for 
the completion of the office and retail centers, repeatedly turning away recommendations for 
joint ventures, once it became apparent that Auchan would not be following through with retail 
construction.  The sheer size of Polnord allowed the company to believe it could build everything 
by itself and pocket all of the profits.  The truth of the matter was that Polnord simply didn’t 
have the personnel and internal know-how to properly deploy its expanded capital base.   
 
In a very telling admission, Okoński opined that “Polnord did not grow up to the leadership role 
it had in the project.”  Throughout 2007, there were a stifling amount of advisors in the Polnord 
office, numerous meetings that extended deep into the night, and ongoing quarrels that hardly 
ever produced a resolution.  Okoński was beginning to lose his passion for the development 
when finally K.R. acquiesced and gave approval to find new partners for the retail plaza.  It was, 
however, too late.  The U.S. real estate crisis was growing in size and soon the global banking 
system grinded to a halt.  There was no capital to be found.  Existing investors in Miasteczko 
retrenched and slowed their pace of residential building and sales.  The opportunity was lost on 
Polnord.  Okoński left the company soon afterwards. 
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3.3 Stagnation, the U.L.I. Award For Excellence and the Comeback: 2009-2011 
The global financial crisis did not shut down any single project in Miasteczko.  It did, however, 
have far-reaching secondary effects, such as constraining the construction loan market, 
hampering Poland’s budding consumer mortgage industry, and throwing into question 
developers’ working capital credit lines.  While parent companies of the Miasteczko builders 
experienced some dire situations – as exemplified by Spanish developer Fadesa’s bankruptcy - 
the local Polish subsidiaries remained adequately-capitalized and operational through the 
downturn. 
 
Poland, itself, fared relatively well through the depths of the crisis.  The country was the only 
one of the 27 European Union members to not record a recession in 2009.  In fact, while the 
emerging Central European economies of Czech Republic (-4.1%), Hungary (-6.7%) and 
Slovakia (-4.8%) suffered sharp contractions in 2009, Poland recorded modest growth (+1.7%).  
This was hardly the result of good fortune or a confluence of extraordinary factors.  It was 
largely attributable to the finance ministry adhering to a responsible fiscal budget and 
conservative borrowing strategy for more than a decade in a concentrated effort to bridge the 
significant gap in wealth and standard of living between Poland and other EU economies.  In 
2004, following its admittance into the EU, Poland embraced additional domestic reforms and 
proactively pursued privatization efforts to spur economic growth.  The results were seen in 
Poland’s steadily increasing GDP, an unemployment rate that mirrored the leading EU nations, 
and a local currency that has held its value against the US dollar and Euro since the mid-2000s. 
 
The broader economic context is brought up to disprove any notion that the development was 
thrown into despair by global financial events.  While Poland’s banks were impacted by global 
events, the project itself was relatively well insulated from the debacle ravaging U.S. and 
Western European financial institutions.  Put even more succinctly, Miasteczko’s haggard 
appearance in 2009 was largely self-inflicted.  What had originated from an entrepreneurial land 
purchase by K.R., a fantastic mixed-use vision and development plan by Guy Perry, and 
steadfast leadership by Zbigniew Okoński had yielded to greed, conceit, and complacency.  K.R. 
had amassed a true fortune through the Prokom-Polnord merger and was already pursuing 
investment opportunities in foreign lands and new industries.  IN-VI’s development advisory 
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contract with Prokom had ended and Perry had since taken on an ad hoc, pro bono role to serve 
the community’s interests and help guide Miasteczko through to completion.  Okoński took on 
the position of President of Robyg Group, one of the initial and oldest developers in Miasteczko 
Wilanόw.  The community wilted through the turmoil of leadership changes and now faced 
indefinite stagnation as the world’s financial system underwent a monumental recapitalization.   
 
Many of the promises made to the community went unkept.  A major north-south thoroughfare 
and several secondary roads had not been built, leaving the greater population of Miasteczko 
reliant on a single east-west road (Klimczaka) to enter and exit the development.  There were no 
elementary schools, neither private nor public, for the many young families that had planned to 
enroll their children locally.  Although there were storefront retailers at the ground floor of many 
residential buildings that offered everyday concessions and services, most other consumer 
shopping needs required an arduous trip by auto or public transport to the shopping centers of 
neighboring districts.  Yet another shortcoming was that there was no central gathering place for 
respite or entertainment in a community that had always posed itself as a self-sufficient, 
centralized village.  Finally, the public spaces and greenery were apportioned and well-
intentioned, but were barren in most areas and conversely, wildly overgrown with weeds and 
wildflowers in other places.  During inclement weather, the development would be reduced to a 
giant mud pit. 
 
 
 
Some of the problems were due to builders focusing first on pre-sales and product delivery, 
while leaving the details of finishing common spaces and landscaping until the absolute last step.  
Miasteczko’s blighted landscape, spring 2010 
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Part of the blame was attributable to a blurred definition as to who – Polnord, project developer, 
or district government - was to complete and/or compensate for roads, public green spaces, and 
other neighborhood features and at what point.  Meanwhile, other shortcomings could be pinned 
on a Wilanόw district government that claimed a lack of finances to properly maintain the roads, 
parks, and green spaces that were already handed over to it.  Since the developers and 
government had already fallen short on various agreements to one another numerous times, their 
disagreements turned into stalemates, followed by malaise, and eventually ambivalence.  There 
was a considerable amount of finger-pointing, but it was the new residents and business owners 
of Miasteczko Wilanόw that truly bore the burden of the development’s incompleteness. 
 
To Guy Perry, Miasteczko was considerably more than a mixed-use project that he and his firm, 
IN-VI, were commissioned to plan, design, and oversee.  It was the largest, most comprehensive 
New Urbanist master plan he had orchestrated in a career dedicated to facilitating sustainable 
communities.  Miasteczko was to be the future model for Emerging Europe’s reconstruction and 
it was becoming the victim of circumstance.  He was acutely aware of the development’s 
difficult situation; he was intrinsically tied to it and compelled to see it through to proper 
completion.  As author of the very rules and parameters that were now being ignored and cast 
aside, Perry began to think that some sort of a rallying cry – a greater purpose perhaps – was 
needed to pull Miasteczko back together.   
 
Perry had consistently championed the development’s cause for the previous decade, throughout 
its many challenges.  In late 2008, he presented the project at the ISOCARP (International 
Society of City and Regional Planners) annual conference that was themed “Growth Without 
Sprawl” and was awarded the organization’s Award for Excellence on behalf of Miasteczko 
Wilanόw.  ISOCARP, a non-government organization, commended the development’s 
comprehensive mixed-use vision and adherence to smart growth principles.  The award was a 
significant honor and it was well received by the Polish press and Miasteczko’s residents.  
However, Perry viewed this as a bigger opportunity – the first step in organizing the community 
at a grassroots level towards that greater cause.  To that end, he eyed Miasteczko Wilanόw as a 
potential entrant for the Urban Land Institute (ULI) Award for Excellence, the most prestigious 
global prize in real estate design and development. 
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The ULI Award differed from the ISOCARP Award in several major respects.  First, ISOCARP 
was an organization primarily focused on urban planning, while ULI additionally had significant 
representations from the complementary areas of real estate construction, design, economics, 
marketing, and management.  Criteria for the ULI Award reflected that constituency in 
specifically stating that entries “must achieve a high standard in all (those) areas.”  Also, while 
ISOCARP concentrated on the development vision and implementation, ULI went further in 
considering the economics of the project as a significant tenant of success or failure:  “Entries 
must be in stabilized operation and financially viable.”  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the ULI Award competition and judgment of entries was an exhaustive process that required the 
coordination and participation of many disparate groups invested in the development: planners, 
designers, builders, owners, residents and government.  Entries were first organized into the 
three regions of the Americas, Europe-Middle East-Africa, and Asia-Pacific, each of which has 
its own jury and schedule.  Regional winners would then advance to the Global Award for 
Excellence and be subjected to probing on-site visits by ULI judges as well as extensive 
interviews with parties involved in the development. 
 
Perry and his staff at IN-VI completed Miasteczko Wilanόw’s application for the ULI Award 
and submitted it with entry fee in February 2010.  Perry included himself, Okoński, and new 
Polnord President Wojciech Ciurzyński as representatives and authorities on the project.  The 
“basis” for the entry was summed up in five points stating that Miasteczko:  
- Replaced what was to be a planned gated residential community with an open, inclusive, 
mixed-use district; 
- A neighborhood that began with a church, hospital and parks, rather than purely commercial 
activities; 
- Dense, human scaled, pedestrian oriented, project, which allows for the creation of parks and 
protection of wetlands; 
- An authentic architectural harmony brought about by the coordinated participation of 20 local 
architectural practices; and 
- Successful for many investors with short term and high return objectives without public sector 
financial support. 
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As a means of quantifying the financial and economic success of the project, the following facts 
were offered to ULI under “market acceptance”: 
- Land value appreciation: $50/sqm in 2000 to $470/sqm in 2010; 
- Developer-specific Return On Investment: Robyg: 2001-2010: 17%-30% annual return; 
Fadesa Polnord: 12%-25%; Wilanów Investments: 10%-25 %; 
- Many international (often first time investors to Poland) and Polish investors have chosen to 
locate within or on the border with MW: Skanska, Robyg, Fadesa, Acciona, Wilanów 
Investments, Medicover, the Archbishop of Warsaw, Skarbiec, Mill-yon, Hines, Pirelli PKO, 
Bouyges Immobilier, Deniz, etc. 
 
Additional information established that the project was roughly 60% built and targeting 
completion in 2016.  The breakdown by product type was as follows: 
 
 
Finally, the application noted the cultural and historical relevance of Miasteczko Wilanόw, its 
adherence to new urbanist principles, its efforts in furthering the public-private partnership 
agenda in a former communist country, the availability of multiple transportation options on site, 
and its standalone profitability. 
 
The regional ULI jury viewed the Miasteczko entry very favorably and informed Perry in the 
spring that it was chosen as a Finalist.  This meant that ULI representatives would be traveling to 
Warsaw in the months ahead to visit, examine, and question the development in person.  
COMMERCIAL SPACE sqm completed sqm at buildout
Office space 28,500 240,500
Retail/restaurant/entertainment space 7,000 68,000
Industrial space 0 0
RESIDENTIAL SPACE units completed units at buildout
Single family units 0 50
Multifamily units 10,900 19,500
Hotel rooms 0 250
Parking spaces 16,350 (85% u.g.) 29,250
Maximum number of storeys 3 (7%); 4 (30%);  5 (60%); 6+ (3%)
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Miasteczko’s rough appearance needed to be cleaned up if it was going to survive the tough 
critics.  On the other hand, this was a fantastic opportunity for the many parties involved in 
Wilanόw to shine and further their own agendas, regardless whether it was political, capitalistic, 
or other.  Perry saw to it that each one of them was aware of the stakes and working towards the 
common goal.   
 
Perry notified the district mayor and council that the ULI jury would be visiting.  He demanded 
that the long-ignored maintenance of Miasteczko’s public spaces be addressed immediately, 
specifically that grass and trees be planted and work on public squares commence.  Mud-covered 
construction equipment and vehicles that were strewn about the development needed to be 
moved immediately  To further pressure the district to action, Perry and his wife Anna Mirska-
Perry – also an officer at IN-VI – began organizing the existing residents’ groups at Miasteczko 
towards a series of citizens’ actions.  The first of these “Move Yourself and Plant” actions was 
scheduled on a weekend in May 2010 and invited the community’s residents to volunteer an 
afternoon to beautify the neighborhood with tree-planting, weeding, and other upkeep.  Another 
problem was the hundreds of unauthorized rogue advertisements – small wooden signs to large 
billboards – that were littering the Miasteczko’s landscape.   
 
 
 
Guy and Anna pressed numerous developers for monetary donations, which were then used to 
purchase plants and basic landscaping tools.  Small businesses provided refreshments and snacks 
for the young professionals and families that would comprise the workforce.  Advertising was 
done by word-of-mouth, online forums, email distributions, and printed placards that were left in 
Rogue advertisements in Miasteczko, mid-2010 
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strategic locations inside the neighborhood shops and each residential building’s ad boards.  
Furthermore, Anna, a former journalist and editor, tapped into her contacts at Warsaw’s major 
newspapers and ensured that the press was covering the event.  The first “action” was a 
resounding success with more than a hundred volunteers planting and landscaping along the 
Royal Axis’ canal.  Perry estimated that more than five hundred signs were taken down and 
replaced with over five hundred hedges.  In the following week, Anna located and distributed 
newspaper and internet coverage of the “action” to all those involved – residents, business 
owners, district representatives – to embolden Miasteczko’s citizens to demand more 
accountability from the developers and local government.  Hence, a grassroots movement was 
born. 
 
 
 
At the same time, Guy Perry was working his own channels to improve the dismal appearance of 
Miasteczko.  He announced that as part of the presentation to the ULI jury he would be naming a 
top five list of exemplary builders and shop owners that embraced and promoted the community 
vision and values of Miasteczko.  He continued that in the spirit of fairness he, unfortunately, 
would also have to nominate a bottom five list of residences and stores that cut corners or 
audaciously flaunted the rules at the expense of the greater community.  Perry emphasized that 
the residents were getting more frustrated with the non-performers, particularly in light of the 
ULI bid.  Specifically, he was targeting a wide range of misdeeds including developers that 
provided no landscaping and put up fences around their residences in a misguided attempt to 
create false exclusivity; storefront retailers that completely covered their windows with print 
Miasteczko’s residents taking down billboards 
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advertisements in a ragtag effort to promote weekly specials; builders that repeatedly dirtied 
roads and sidewalks with their construction machinery; and advertisers that set up make-shift 
signs on public grounds.  Perry’s aim was to make each individual personally responsible for 
their actions, provide a greater sense of ownership for Miasteczko’s wide range of stakeholders, 
and add transparency across the community.  The shortcomings of Miasteczko were due to many 
people putting their own agendas first.  Now everyone would have come back in line to deliver 
on the original vision and promise of Miasteczko. 
 
In another effort, Perry put pressure on Polnord and the local government to accelerate work on 
building and finishing additional roads.  This would alleviate traffic congestion by dispersing 
auto flow to the development’s other access points and allow bus lines to begin service along the 
central Rzeczpospolita corridor.  New boulevards and avenues would also promote a needed 
cohesiveness across the development.  Several television interviews and newspaper articles 
served to highlight residents’ disappointment with the speed of the build-out, putting Polnord and 
the district representatives under additional scrutiny. 
 
By the time the ULI jury arrived at Miasteczko Wilanόw in the summer of 2010, the 
development had made great strides towards returning to the magnificent new European city 
designed by IN-VI and promised by Prokom a decade earlier.  The public green spaces and 
canals were landscaped, rogue advertisements were removed, fences and other barricades were 
largely dismantled, and new thoroughfares were reaching completion.  While Perry still 
produced a list of the lagging five developers/business owners, he admitted that a dialogue had 
been initiated with those parties and efforts at reconciliation to the development’s vision had 
been made.  Finally, the ULI jury was highly impressed by the number of citizens’ actions and 
ongoing activism of local residents; this proved that Miasteczko had achieved a sense of true 
local democracy, in line with its original ideals of openness, accessibility, and inclusivity.  
 
In August 2010, IN-VI and its development partners were informed that Miasteczko Wilanόw 
had received the ULI Award for Excellence in its EMEA edition, which covers Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa.  The EMEA regional competition started with 43 entries from 17 
countries, was narrowed down to 14 finalists, and concluded with four winners.  Those four 
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recipients, along with winners from the Asia-Pacific and Americas regions, now qualified for the 
ULI Global Awards for Excellence competition, which would be held in Washington D.C. in 
October.  The new ULI Global jury was comprised of international land planning and design 
experts and had the mandate of selecting up to five winners from the three regions. 
 
A small group of Miasteczko representatives, including Perry, Okoński, and other development 
partners, made the trip to the ULI Fall Meeting and Land Expo and presented before the 
international panel that fall.  On October 14th, the jury announced that it had chosen Miasteczko 
Wilanόw as one of the five ULI Global Award for Excellence winners.  The international 
competition had started in February with 240 entries and Miasteczko stood alone as the sole 
honoree from the EMEA region.  The other winners were LA Live (Los Angeles, USA); Thin 
Flats (Philadelphia, USA); Rouse Hill Town Centre (New South Wales, Australia); and Southern 
Ridges (Singapore).   
 
From the start, Perry believed that Miasteczko was a strong entrant and that it fulfilled ULI’s 
mission of providing leadership in the responsible use of land, in addition to creating and 
sustaining thriving communities across the world.  However, he was admittedly surprised that it 
had achieved such high recognition from the organization for other reasons.  For one thing, ULI 
typically bestowed the Award for Excellence on planners, designers, and developers that had 
spent a lifetime addressing the needs of smart growth and responsible building.  On the contrary, 
Miasteczko was the product of a consortium of disparate and relatively new developers in an 
emerging economy.  Then there was the question of future leadership: IN-VI was the visionary 
and chief advisor behind the project, but its service contract ended in 2008 leaving the 
development without a central planner or designer.  It would be up to the people of Wilanόw to 
take the ULI Award as their inspiration and combine it with their new found organizational 
might to petition Polnord, its development partners, and the district government to produce the 
Wilanόw neighborhood that they had long been promised.  That was all fine and good because 
already several recent events transpired in Miasteczko that could potentially have significant 
ramifications for the neighborhood. 
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In March 2010, Israel-based shopping mall developer Global Trade Centre (GTC) purchased the 
7.5 hectare retail-zoned parcel near the town center.  Auchan had previously made a down-
payment on the land rights, but walked away from the deal in favor of other south Warsaw 
locations after it became apparent that it would not be able to build a hypermarket in Wilanόw to 
its desired specifications.  GTC’s agreement with Polnord was once again under the 51%/49% 
development partnership, in this case named Centrum Handlowe Wilanόw.  GTC pledged to 
invest a total of Euro 170 million to the 60,000 sqm project and announced its intentions to break 
ground in the second half of 2010. (WBJ, 2010)   
 
While the news looked to resolve the long-standing absence of a retail center at Wilanόw, the 
fact that GTC was the new developer gave local residents pause.  GTC had been successful in 
building a number of profitable retail centers in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia.  The 
problem, however, was that GTC historically developed enclosed indoor shopping malls in 
nearly all of its locations.  This flew in the face of Miasteczko’s original master plan, which 
called for an outdoor shopping plaza that would be integrated into the rest of the town center.  A 
standalone mall could potentially upset the dynamics of the Miasteczko residential community 
and serve to undermine the prestige and cultural significance of the neighboring Wilanόw Palace 
and Gardens. 
 
Separately, Polnord had announced progress towards the construction of the office park at the 
southern end of Miasteczko.  In early 2009, international real estate consultancy Cushman & 
Wakefield (C&W) became the exclusive leasing agent for the office park.  Polnord broke ground 
the following year and by the time of the ULI Award announcement in October 2010, the first 
commercial building was well underway and another two were scheduled for ground breaking.  
The first three buildings would offer a combined 21,600 sqm of gross leasable office space in a 
complex that aimed for 18 buildings and 140,000 sqm at completion.  While the construction of 
the office park was not necessarily seen as a negative, there was still only one paved road leading 
into that area of Miasteczko.  The local residents were again concerned about the impact of 
additional construction-related vehicles and, shortly thereafter, new office tenants on their 
capacity constrained roadways. 
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The ISOCARP and ULI Awards were major victories for all those involved in Miasteczko 
Wilanόw.  The process brought the residents, developers, and district representatives back 
together towards the common goal of finishing the development.  However, it remained to be 
seen if the international honors would prove to just be footnotes, or if they would be strong 
enough influences to keep Miasteczko focused on its original New Urbanist principles.  In any 
case, Guy Perry and the residents of the community were not planning to let up on Polnord or the 
district officials. 
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Chapter 4   Snapshot of Miasteczko Wilanόw: Summer 2011  
Nearly a year after the ULI jury journeyed to Wilanόw to assess the development, the site 
remains a massive work in progress.  Construction is once again proceeding at a normal rate with 
cranes running during the daytime on the new office park and temple.  Work is also being done 
on several new residential buildings with some projects in initial groundbreaking stages while 
others are opening their doors to new residents.  Meanwhile new roads have been finished and 
opened up to auto and bus traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
The cohesiveness that IN-VI and Prokom targeted in their early designs is quite apparent from a 
quick drive through the complex.  There is an attractive mix of individually-styled contemporary 
residential buildings with ample ground floor restaurant, café, provisions, and services options.  
The temple – although years from being completed – has already opened its catacombs to the 
public and its frontage is now a regular venue for festivals and concerts.  The sidewalks are 
teeming with life with a multi-generational mix of baby strollers, young professionals, and 
seniors.  The leisurely pedestrian needs to keep a watchful eye on the bike paths, where a 
recreational cyclist or jogger may fly by at any instant. 
Temple & Office Park construction (left) & Rzeczpospolita Avenue (right) - June 2011 
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It is true, however, that the development is heavily weighted towards multifamily housing.  This 
has been a favorite criticism of the press over the last several years with unfortunate comparisons 
made to the single-use residential focus of Soviet-era urban plans.  Also many other important 
elements still remain missing from the site.  There are no grade schools and high schools, only a 
handful of kindergarten programs.  The planned city center and retail plaza have not yet been 
started.  The temple will require another five to eight years for completion.  The office park, with 
its promise of on-site employment opportunities, is still in its infancy. 
 
 
 
Guy Perry is both an avid supporter and regular defender of the development with the media 
covering the district.  He is all too aware of the many challenges and the intricacies of specific 
development relationships that Miasteczko has endured along the way.  Perry is ever respectful 
but also forthright in answering tough, probing, and sometimes stinging questions on the 
development’s shortcomings to date.  Often he guides the interviewer back to the big picture, 
Aerial views of Miasteczko’s residential buildings 
Everyday street life at Miasteczko – June 2011 
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stating that while projects have been delayed they will be completed properly, that overall this is 
a phenomenal feat of organization in newly capitalistic Central European economy, and that 
Miasteczko is a neighborhood that keeps improving with time and will stand the test of 
generations to come. 
 
As is the case with the country of Poland, the history of Miasteczko Wilanόw is long, 
convoluted, and often subject to competing outside forces.  It is best to understand the context 
and evolution of Miasteczko to formulate appropriate opinions on its current appearance.  Surely 
mistakes have been made and there is plenty to be learned from its inability to phase in real 
estate types and neighborhood elements by the time of this writing.   Perhaps it’s best to first 
provide an update on the development’s immediate status in a few paragraphs. 
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4.1 Infrastructure 
For the most part, the roadways of Miasteczko have been constructed and are being well-utilized 
today.  A previous problem was the heavy reliance of one avenue for entrance into and exit out 
of Miasteczko; that was through the east-west boulevard of Klimczaka.  In the past year, the 
four-lane boulevard of Rzeczpospolita (“Republic Avenue”), which runs north-south through the 
center of the development, has been completed and opened to the public.  This was designed to 
accommodate heavy traffic and has several bus stops providing much needed public 
transportation options as well as wide center margin should a future tram line ever materialize.  
The look of Rzeczpospolita is clearly meant to mirror the grandeur of the Royal Way, to which it 
connects at its northern end.  The southern end will eventually provide access to the office park 
under construction as well as the planned S2 ring road. 
 
 
 
A second avenue running east-west from future site of Wilanόw Town Hall and Royal Plaza has 
been completed and just recently connected to Rzeczpospolita.  Fittingly, the District Council 
unanimously approved its unofficial name of “Royal Axis” in June 2011.  Like Klimczaka, this 
avenue has a landscaped canal in its center; it is just wide enough to allow parallel parking but 
still quite narrow to restrict traffic speeds.  At its western end (near Rzeczpospolita) the canal 
disappears and the median expands into a wide flat area that will eventually be a tree-lined park 
open for many public uses. 
 
To the south and west of the development where the office park is undergoing construction, 
paved roads make way to pot-holed dirt paths.  While this would be considered normal for an 
Rzeczpospolita Avenue – June 2011 
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area still being built, the Medicover hospital (near the center) and first office building (at the far 
western end) are already operational.  Navigating these paths is quite a burden for normal 
passenger vehicles.  This once again alludes to problems in the construction, ownership and 
compensation for these roads.  The City of Warsaw was supposed to fund Polnord’s construction 
of roads beforehand.  In practice, the city has not had the budget to afford them and Polnord has 
had to be creative in its financing.  In 2009, Polnord asked the city to pay roughly US$62 million 
for 159,000 sqm of land that would be utilized by the future ring road and other avenues.  The 
city refused to do so causing Polnord to press litigation in the provincial courts.  While the court 
sided with Polnord, the city stated it would still not be able to compensate until ground-breaking.  
In July 2011, Polnord announced that it had sold these receivables, due from the city, at a heavy 
discount (US$36 million) to Polish Enterprise Bank to provide liquidity for the roads’ 
construction.  Again, it is the tenants and clients of the hospital and office buildings that suffer 
from the bureaucratic wrangling. 
 
Otherwise, roads that have been completed are lined with brick sidewalks and paved bike paths.  
As mentioned earlier, they are well-utilized from early-morning to late night hours by many 
residents.  Crosswalks are abundant throughout Miasteczko and provide ample safety for 
mothers with baby carriages and children running to the playing fields at the western boundary 
of the development. 
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4.2 Common Areas and Green Spaces 
In May 2011, the District of Wilanόw-maintained green spaces were once again overgrown 
throughout Miasteczko.  In fact, the common lawns, canals and other green spaces had not yet 
been landscaped this year due to what the district categorized as a contract impasse with a third-
party vendor.  It was widely-believed that the district simply didn’t have the funds to hire the 
contractors earlier.  In early-June a contract was finally signed and landscapers quickly addressed 
the nearly foot-high grass and much needed weeding.  Still, it left a bad feeling for many 
residents: common pathways were largely unusable for half the outdoor months and frustrated 
dog owners stopped cleaning after their pets.  Not only did it look unattractive, but it quickly 
became unsanitary, particularly with the insect life found around the canals. 
 
 
 
 
As for the citizens’ actions, Anna Mirska-Perry organized the sixth in a series of “Move Yourself 
and Plant” events in June 2011, in which more than 50 saplings were planted along the Royal 
Axis.  In fact, her determination in promoting and leading the beautification of Miasteczko was 
acknowledged by Polish newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza/Gazeta Stołeczna in February 2011, 
when IN-VI received the “Stołek Award” citizens’ award.  The publishers noted that “IN-VI 
organized and participated in, along with hundreds of residents, neighborhood actions to remove 
illegal advertisements, clean, weed, cut grass, plant trees and hedges as well as to install public 
benches.  Actions were initiated as a reaction to the general disregard and lack of maintenance of 
public spaces in this area.”   
Miasteczko’s unkempt green spaces –May 2011 
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Anna and Guy have remained very active representing the community’s interests even after the 
end of IN-VI’s formal advisory contract.  They are in close contact with the new mayor of 
Wilanόw District, who himself is a young, progressive, and community-focused individual.  IN-
VI plans additional actions in 2011 with funds largely gathered as donations from Miasteczko 
project developers and small business owners.  One of the actions will install additional park 
benches in the public spaces.  In fact, several of the benches placed along the Klimczaka canal in 
late spring were being well-utilized for picnics and small family gatherings nearly on a daily 
basis once the common grounds were landscaped.  Another action for later in the year will outfit 
outdoor exercise equipment – as sometimes seen in municipal parks in the U.S. – along the 
pedestrian walkways of the development.  Yet another action calls for the removal of unlicensed 
rogue signs that often creep up across the development’s lawns and common spaces. 
 
 
 
  
“Move Yourself and Plant” citizens’ action – June 4, 2011 
Miasteczko’s canals (left) & green spaces (right), when properly maintained 
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4.3 The Retail Center Debate 
The future shopping center is probably the most concerning and closely-watched situation by 
Guy Perry, IN-VI, the residents of Miasteczko, and the Wilanόw district council.  Simply put, 
there is great consternation that GTC will opt to build another fully-enclosed mall, reminiscent of 
the company’s other Central European constructs, at the site.  Such a retail center would be 
counter to the open, accessible theme of the new residential development and serve to detract 
from the historical and cultural beauty of Wilanόw Place and Gardens directly across the street.  
Perry has been vigilant in the press stating that the citizens of Wilanόw have waited long for an 
appropriate retail plaza to be built and has offered multiple examples of outdoor, community-
integrated, financially-successful malls that GTC should use as guidance.  Perry is well-quoted 
saying that the regional mall “rat-in-box, shop-till-you-drop” format is no longer viable in the 
United States and Western Europe and would also prove outdated in Miasteczko in a very short 
time.  The potential impact of an empty mall could have tremendous ramifications on the 
character and future real estate prices of the Miasteczko neighborhood. 
 
As noted earlier, GTC made its initial investment into the Wilanόw retail site in March 2010.  At 
the time it announced that it would spend a total of roughly EUR 175 million to construct the 
mall.  In August, the Polnord-GTC joint venture entity, Centrum Handlowe, acquired the 
necessary anti-trust approvals from the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
(UOKiK).  In May 2011, GTC revealed that it had agreed to sell its remaining 50% stake in 
nearby Galeria Mokotόw to retail owner-operator Unibail Rodamco for EUR 138 million.  The 
proceeds are expected to be used towards its new Wilanόw project. 
 
At the time of this writing, GTC had not yet made public its design intentions for the retail site.  
In a meeting with Perry at GTC’s Poland headquarters in mid-June, General Manager Piotr 
Kroenke did offer some insights into the company’s position on Wilanόw.  He stated that the 
developer had not brought forth any designs to date because it was still studying all of its 
options.  Kroenke appeared to suggest that he had read some of Perry’s more recent pointed 
comments and that his group was exploring incorporating elements of an outdoor plaza into its 
plan.  However, he admitted that this required somewhat of a change in culture for his 
organization since they had a proven business model in building profitable indoor malls.  In 
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particular, he noted that indoor greenery, perhaps in the form of a winter garden, was being 
assessed.  For his part, Perry offered that the residents of Wilanόw greatly desired that the 
original promises of the master plan be realized and he pushed GTC to be a leading force for 
retail builders in Central Europe.  Kroenke expected that initial designs for the site would be 
revealed to the district council and townspeople by year’s end. 
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4.4 The Town Center Carcass  
Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita broke the story about an ongoing corruption investigation into 
Town Hall builder Deniz and its underhanded dealings with a Wilanόw government official in 
2004.  Deniz deserted its project in short order, effectively admitting to its complicity in the 
criminal acts.  The half-built Town Hall and its accompanying buildings were left as a steel-and-
concrete carcass, cordoned off by high fences and soon covered by spray-paint.  Ownership of 
the assets remained in limbo for years as the investigation led to court proceedings, resulting in 
heavy fines to Deniz and liens on the site.  Meanwhile, the structures themselves soon found 
themselves in a small pond of water as infrastructure improvements were never completed 
properly and the Wilanόw area in general has a very high water table.  Over several winter and 
summer seasons, people became skeptical if the building shells could be salvaged.  The lack of a 
well-established bankruptcy process in Poland prevented potential new owners from settling 
claims and restarting the project in the first several years.  The global financial crisis eliminated 
that opportunity in the latter years. 
 
Over time, Guy Perry suggested several alternatives to deal with the massive eyesore at the 
eastern entrance to Miasteczko, including covering the shells with some kind of basic weather-
resistant material.  He was rebuffed several times by the district council.  The money wasn’t 
there and not many officials were comfortable dealing with such a debacle that so prominently 
featured their former colleague.  As a result, the structures sat there as a prominent reminder that 
Miasteczko did have its troubles. 
 
In the summer of 2011, it was suggested that the Town Hall complex could see a resolution 
shortly.  An unidentified developer from Krakow had secured control of the assets earlier in the 
year.  Whether the deal was an outright purchase or simply a partial down-payment was not 
revealed.  However, the very scant details offered were that the developer looked to commence 
construction at the site with the existing building shells by mid-2012.  If correct, this would be a 
major positive, even if only psychologically, for the Miasteczko community and the neighboring 
Wilanόw estate. 
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4.5 Ongoing Office Park Construction 
By summer 2011, construction of three separate office buildings were underway in the 
southernmost 17 hectares of the development.  In a conversation with new Polnord CEO Bartosz 
Puzdrowski, he shared the following information on the current status and future direction of the 
employment center.  Phase One of the office park is underway and will produce 14 to 15 
buildings at a minimum size of 8,000 sqm each.  The area will have a classic office park layout 
but will highlight contemporary architectural designs and be worked into the ecological features 
of its surroundings.  Polnord looks to complete one to two buildings a year depending on market 
demand.  Furthermore, the developer has utilized 40% financing under typical construction loan 
terms and conditions to proceed with building activities. 
 
 
 
The overall marketing focus for Wilanόw Office Park is mid-sized company headquarters and 
back office activities, such as call centers.  Its most direct competition is found in the 
neighboring District of Mokotόw, which has large established business complexes that are at 
near full capacity.  Tenants in Mokotόw often complain about the lack of parking and worsening 
traffic conditions.  In contrast, Wilanόw will offer over 4,800 dedicated underground spots as 
well as the future S2 ring road as locational advantages.  In line with the Mokotόw district, 
Polnord is targeting headline rents of EUR 14-15 per sqm prior to rent-free discounts and custom 
fit-outs.  Other advantages include Wilanόw’s large floor plates, energy-usage certifications, and 
attractive architecture.  In the future, Puzdrowski does see synergies with the Miasteczko 
residential community, where educated young professionals, in their first or second jobs, can 
work very close to home.  However, that is not a main focus with the current rollout.  
Miasteczko Office Park & Technology Center – June 2011 
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As for market timing, the first building will be ready for occupancy in approximately two months 
and is already leased to an international construction subcontractor.  The second building has 
been purchased by an information technology company and is scheduled for completion in early 
2012; although the space was originally leased by the entity, the awarding of several government 
grants forced the IT provider into the purchase decision.  The third office building is 60% pre-
leased as Polnord’s future headquarters; the remainder is being marketed in the open market. 
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Chapter 5   Successes & Limitations 
An understanding of the history of Miasteczko Wilanόw is critical to making an informed and 
objective assessment of the whether the development has met, exceeded, or fallen short of its 
objectives.  It is quite clear that the founders of Miasteczko had a broader mission of creating: 1) 
a large-scale, mixed-use development that 2) cohesively integrated the various real estate types 
of residential, commercial, office, and public facilities in a 3) community that would be self-
sustaining and 4) provide its individual stakeholders a high quality of life.  The vision and goals 
were laid out by Guy Perry and his firm IN-VI in the master plan, which was meant to both be a 
blueprint for the future community and to set specific parameters and rules for building projects 
within it.  However, the history indicates that there have been numerous challenges that 
Miasteczko has faced in the decade since the mission and vision were originally laid out.  Many 
of these have been completely out of the control of Prokom, IN-VI, and other development 
partners.  The important question is in discerning which, and how much of each, of the successes 
and failures of Miasteczko can be attributable to the planning and management of the project. 
 
In the next few paragraphs, the positives and negatives of Miasteczko Wilanόw will be quickly 
summarized.  In the following chapter, two additional large-scale, mixed-use developments will 
be presented and reviewed as comparables for Miasteczko.  The thesis will conclude with a final 
chapter on the lessons learned from all three developments, and offer suggestions and 
recommendations in the form of policies that should be implemented to facilitate the 
construction and phasing of such massive real estate projects. 
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5.1 New Urbanism in Practice 
Miasteczko Wilanόw is undoubtedly a success when one considers its fundamental mission of 
creating a unique neighborhood that aspires to the standards and principles of New Urbanism.  
Miasteczko is much more than a new real estate development in Warsaw.  It is its own district 
that is open, inviting, and attractive to those who live in it and others who simply pass through it.  
It is contemporary in design, but quite unique from block to block due to the wide array of 
builders and architects employed in its development.  Miasteczko’s multifamily buildings are 
consistently five-stories high throughout the development; however, they are neither monotone 
nor overbearing.  Each residence has adequate set-backs from the streets and sidewalks, and the 
buildings themselves “step back” with each rising floor.  These features combine to produce a 
true human-scale with plenty of sunlight and attractive landscaping throughout the development.  
The community is very walkable in its size and its pedestrian-friendly layout.  There are wide, 
inlaid-brick sidewalks that run along every street, and crosswalks are well-marked and controlled 
by traffic signals.  The abundance of ground floor retailers across many of the multifamily 
structures offers significant options for dining, casual gatherings, daily provisions, and basic 
services. 
  
 
 
Miasteczko has done an excellent job of respecting and preserving the natural environment of 
Wilanόw.  Canals were built into many low-lying areas with parks interspaced between them.  
Numerous existing trees were either left undisturbed or transplanted into new locations were they 
could thrive and beautify the community.  The green spaces and natural pathways within 
Miasteczko are already informal recreational and meeting areas for its residents; seeing families 
picnic on the newly-installed park benches is a regular sight in the development.  Finally, the 
Miasteczko’s human-scale and diversity in contemporary building design 
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centrally-located Temple of Divine Providence has already hosted a series of major festivals and 
events over the past two years, further evidencing the community’s inclusivity to those residing 
outside of its neighborhood borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the lack of a retail plaza and formal town center are legitimate grips of Miasteczko’s 
residents, those areas were planned from the beginning and have been delayed by external events 
and specific issues with development partners.  Those projects, although often considered in 
limbo, will be completed over the next several years.  Furthermore, the development of the office 
park and future ring road in the southern part of the development add the new dimensions of 
employment center and highway accessibility.  All in all, Miasteczko has met its goals of 
providing an integrated and cohesive mixed-use development within Wilanόw. 
Miasteczko’s green spaces, canals, and pathways 
Community offerings: street festival (left) & children’s playground (right) 
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5.2 Financial Profitability 
The development of Miasteczko Wilanόw has been a highly profitable investment from several 
different perspectives.  First, Prokom recorded strong gains from its initial purchase of 169 
hectares of raw land in Wilanόw and subsequent resale of zoned and permitted parcels to other 
co- developers.  The following chart lists Prokom’s land transactions in Miasteczko.  Italicized 
inputs and grey boxes indicate rough estimates. 
 
 
 
Second, in nearly every one of Prokom’s land sales, the company kept a 49% minority stake in 
the new development entity that would construct, build, finance, market, and sell those 
individual building projects.  In effect, Prokom was selling the land claim outright, but keeping 
half of the upside from producing the finished product and selling it to homeowners and business 
owners. 
 
Third, the new development partnerships – the companies that bought rezoned land parcels from 
Prokom, constructed the individual projects, and sold them to final purchasers – were highly 
profitable as well.  On the ULI Award application, Miasteczko’s co-developers provided annual 
Return On Investment (ROI) figures on specific projects that were well into the double digits: 
Robyg (17%-30%); Fadesa (12%-25%); and Wilanόw Investments (10%-25%).   
 
Using a variety of sources, the basic economics of a development partnership appears as follows: 
Price in US$mm Size (in hectares) Developer Date Purpose Appx. price/sqm
($110.0) 169.0 Prokom 1999 raw land purchase $65
Deniz 1999 town center
n/m 4.0 Church - Temple late-2000 land swap
($50.0) n/m Prokom 2001 basic infrastructure 
$20.0 8.4 Robyg 2001 residential $240
downpayment n/a 14.8 Auchan late-2001 commercial / retail
$20.0 8.0 Wilanόw Investments (PKO) 2003 residential $250
3.8 Skanska early-2004 hotel / office
$32.0 16.0 Fadesa Polska 2004 residential $200.0
$28.0 7.0 Mill-yon / ILDC 2005 residential $400.0
$15.0 3.0 Skarbiec 2006 residential $500.0
$17.0 3.4 Acciona 2007 residential $500.0
$20.0 4.0 Hines 2007 residential $500.0
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In the chart above, total overhead includes construction, corporate salaries and wages, financing 
costs, and design services.  Assuming 40% debt financing, a 9% interest rate, and a 30-month 
period to full return, the Internal Rate of Return on the development partnership structure is 
around 18%. 
 
Finally, the completed real estate buildings – regardless of whether residential, retail, office or 
other – need a property management company to oversee their upkeep.  While this business is 
often considered difficult due to its high personnel turnover and lower margins, it does provide a 
new income stream after the conclusion of construction activities.  For many builders, this 
operating entity could be outsourced or sold to third parties for additional gains. 
 
  
US$ per buildable sqm
Land purchase $375
Total overhead $2,000
Total Cost on Average $2,375
Markup: 20% $475
Sales Point $2,850
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5.3 The Golden Goose: Stellar Demographics 
For decades, marketing and advertising firms have been searching for and experimenting with 
approaches to best target the young, educated, independent-minded, upwardly-mobile segment of 
the population that dictate new trends and have abundant disposable income to spend on them.  
The means of getting to this group has historically been focused on media outlets: hit television 
programs, fashionable celebrities, and popular music genres.  It is interesting to note, though, 
that New Urbanist developments such Miasteczko Wilanόw attract this demographic in droves.  
Recent census counts in Poland have shown that Miasteczko has the youngest, most educated, 
and highest income earning individuals in Warsaw and Poland.  Furthermore, the residents of 
Miasteczko are extremely politically-active, as evidenced in the 2010 Presidential and District 
Council elections when local voter turnout of over 80% broke national records.  New Urbanism 
does seem to create a more democratic society as well. 
 
Not surprisingly, the people of Miasteczko have become more organized and vocal as their 
frustrations have increased with the district government and various developers.  In the last 
election cycle, two residents – Katarzyna Radzikowska and Stanisław Orzeł – that were already 
active in citizens’ action committees but had no prior political experience were elected to the 
Wilanόw District Council by overwhelming 4-to-1 margins.  That vote also unseated the 
incumbent district mayor, who was perceived as slow to act and ignorant of many citizens’ 
requests to improve the neighborhood.  The new mayor, who like Radzikowska and Orzeł is in 
his 30s, holds regular discussions with the Miasteczko community representatives and has even 
joined residents in recent “Move Yourself and Plant” actions. 
 
Furthermore, the stellar demographics of Miasteczko Wilanόw seemingly provide a treasure 
trove of untapped business opportunities.  Future retail plaza developer GTC, for one, is well-
aware of the strong buying power of the local community and is modifying its shopping mall 
plans in answer to the residents’ basic demands.  Rogue advertisers also angle to capitalize on 
the local disposable income and regularly flaunt community regulations by parking their mobile 
advertisement trailers in strategic locations throughout the development, much to the dismay of 
the neighborhood representatives.  Meanwhile, other businesses targeting the young, early-
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adopter demographic, such as rental car company ZipCar, have been in discussions with the 
community to set up operations within Miasteczko’s boundaries. 
 
  
81 
 
5.4 Development Leadership: A Work In Progress 
In Miasteczko’s early days, Prokom was a young, aspiring, entrepreneurial company.  The head 
of the company, K.R., put the Wilanόw land purchase in the hands of senior officer, Zbigniew 
Okoński, who had the fortitude and relationships to drive the new business.  Okoński, himself, 
quickly saw that the company did not have the know-how necessary to put a 169 hectare parcel 
to highest and best use, despite Prokom’s success with small-scale real estate projects.  The 
decision to bring in Guy Perry of TrizecHahn, and later IN-VI, as development advisor was 
paramount to Miasteczko’s success over the following decade.  Often times, leadership is the 
ability to best recognize, organize, and coordinate one’s available resources; this was Prokom’s 
approach for the better part of a decade and it experienced great financial reward as a result. 
 
As Miasteczko grew increasingly successful, Prokom became bigger and more insulated from 
the troubles brewing at “street level”.  Rather, the focus was turned towards the real estate 
company’s merger with Polnord and the subsequent windfall profits of its initial public offering.  
Meanwhile, the scandal-mired town hall / city center was deserted as a half-finished skeleton, the 
retail plaza business partners were never able to break ground, and promised roads and green 
spaces went unfinished for years.  Okoński left Polnord as it succumbed to internal turmoil.  The 
contract with development advisor, IN-VI, lapsed in 2008 with Polnord desiring to complete the 
development on its own terms. 
 
Polnord appears to have reassessed its approach towards Miasteczko in the wake of the global 
real estate crisis.  In the last year, the company hired a new CEO – Bartosz Puzdrowski – from 
outside its ranks.  Polnord has forged ahead with the office park and has secured several new 
tenants for its initial buildings.  Furthermore, the developer has ceased ties with Auchan and has 
brought in GTC as its new retail development partner.  The need for a strong lead developer is 
unquestionably needed in a project of this scale and magnitude.  While Prokom served this role 
well in its early-going, it remains to be seen whether Polnord will fulfill the promise of the 
original master plan for Wilanόw. 
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5.5 Local Government as a Partner 
The District of Wilanόw is a rather new construct, formed out of the expansion of Warsaw’s city 
borders in the 1990s.  While compensation for the Miasteczko Wilanόw’s infrastructure has been 
guaranteed by the Warsaw City Council since its groundbreaking, actual payments have been 
few and much delayed.  Polnord recently took the unusual step of forward selling its receivables 
from the city for infrastructure improvements; that it sold the receivables at a significant discount 
to face value shows the uncertainty of the eventual collection amount and timing.   
 
Simply put, the District of Wilanόw has had neither the tax collection base nor the budget to fund 
new roads, maintain green spaces, and work proactively with the local citizens’ groups.  This 
may be a New Urbanist version of the chicken-or-egg-debate: do the roads get build first and 
then tax-paying residents move in, or do taxes first need to be collected from pioneering 
homeowners and then the lacking infrastructure gets built out?  In the absence of a solution, 
residents have independently organized themselves and run their own campaigns for town 
council positions to affect change in the local government.  The election of two representatives 
from within the community, in addition to a new mayor, is a significant achievement for 
Miasteczko.  Regardless, the Wilanόw and Warsaw government authorities have not provided 
adequately support and funding for the development to date. 
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5.6 Lack of Schools 
The onus for the lack of elementary and high schools within Miasteczko falls squarely on 
Prokom and Polnord.  There were plans for two international schools – one German and one 
French – next to the temple in IN-VI’s master plan.  In 2000, there were preliminary talks with 
potential operators and a deal was reached for two hectares with a German society looking to 
open a local Willy Brandt school.  Despite the transaction, that educational facility has not yet 
materialized.   
 
It wasn’t until 2009 that Polnord reached a deal with the City of Warsaw for the sale of 4.5 
hectares to be used for the construction of Miasteczko’s own public grade and high schools.  
Educational facilities are a core of any community and Prokom should have planned the transfer 
– either through sale, land swap, or gift – of those lands before its initial groundbreaking. 
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Chapter 6   Comparables 
A better perspective on the success and shortcomings of Miasteczko Wilanόw can be gained by 
examining other large-scale mixed-use developments.  By analyzing the history, planning, 
phasing, and development of comparable communities, recommendations can be made on how 
the developers of Miasteczko could have preempted certain issues earlier in its build-out and 
perhaps even improve the approach to other problems Miasteczko faces today.  The 
developments of Kentlands and The Pinehills have been chosen due to several important 
similarities with Miasteczko.  First, both Kentlands and Pinehills are located in large 
metropolitan areas within relative proximity to the city center.  Second, both are greenfield 
developments that have needed to incorporate historical landmarks and/or ecological features 
into their sites.  Third, both are large-scale projects with each one creating at least 2,500 new 
residences and over 75,000 square meters in retail and commercial space.  Finally, Kentlands and 
Pinehills are either completed or in the latter stages of development. 
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6.1 Kentlands, Maryland, USA  
Kentlands is a new urbanist, master planned community in Gaithersburg, Maryland.  It is situated 
roughly 20 miles north-northwest of Washington D.C. and encompasses an area of 141 hectares 
(352 acres).  Like Miasteczko, Kentlands was built from scratch on lands that were previously 
used mainly for agriculture and animal pasture.  Over its history, the parcel had several 
prominent family owners that built beautiful estates on the grounds.  One of those landholders, 
Otis Beall Kent, laid the groundwork for the ecologically-sensitive, mixed-use community in the 
mid-1900s when he built a chain of lakes on the plot that had the dual purpose of water retention 
for irrigation / flood control and a dedicated habitat for birds and wildlife.  Upon his death in the 
1960s, Kent deeded a certain amount of these lands to nature preservation societies. 
 
The tract was purchased in early-1988 by Joseph Alfandre, a local real estate developer, who 
sought to construct an integrated community along the lines of Traditional Neighborhood 
Development principles.  Alfandre commissioned Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk 
(DPZ), the husband-wife urban planning team credited with designing the successful new 
urbanist town of Seaside, Florida.  Together, they worked closely with the Gaithersburg mayor, 
town council, neighboring residents, and other Montgomery County stakeholders to share ideas, 
build consensus, and formulate a vision for the future community.  An intense five-day 
brainstorming session in June 1988 with representatives of these disparate groups was 
memorialized as the Kentlands Charette, a model of public-private cooperation on urban 
planning. 
 
The Kentlands Charette resulted in a master plan that provided for a high quality of life for its 
residents while preserving the historical, cultural, and natural attributes of the land.  The 
neighborhood would be walkable, pedestrian-friendly, and human-scaled.  The “downtown” area 
would be centralized and higher-density with shops, services, office space, and apartments.  The 
development would decline in density to single-family housing as one went out to town’s 
perimeter.  A wide-variety of housing types – condominiums, townhouses, live-work units, 
attached housing, and standalone cottages and homes – would be offered, therefore providing 
ample living options to people of different ages, income brackets, and household sizes.  
Furthermore, the neighborhood would incorporate many features important to the vibrancy of 
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any community, such as places of worship, schools, activity centers, recreational facilities, parks, 
and landmarks. 
 
 
 
As a means of accelerating the zoning changes and extending further goodwill to the 
municipality, Alfandre offered to refurbish and donate the historical buildings formerly 
belonging to the magnate family landowners to the city.  Concurrently, Kentlands’ lakes, green 
spaces, and quarry would be transferred to the city parks system.  These altruistic acts were 
meant to establish a civic focus early on for the development: those sites would always be in the 
public domain and never be compromised by future private owners.  The zoning changes and 
building approvals were ratified expeditiously and construction commenced in 1989.  Once 
construction began, the ownership and management of the development transferred over to Great 
Seneca Development Corporation, a subsidiary of a Maryland bank.  The first model homes were 
on display by mid-1990 and Kentlands first wave of residents began to populate the community 
in 1991. 
 
 
Kentlands, MD urban plan & aerial photograph 
Kentlands’ historical sites - Kentlands Mansion (left) & Art Barn (right) 
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Given the strong market acceptance and profitability of the development, a large adjacent site 
was purchased six years later to replicate the Kentlands model and intensify the existing 
downtown density.  Again, DPZ were brought into the process and another charette was 
organized with city representatives and community members to design the newly-named 
neighborhood of Lakelands.  This also proved to be another phenomenal success.  The larger size 
of the combined communities allowed for a far greater concentration and mix of shops, offices, 
and community offerings in the downtown area.  Furthermore, the higher population had the 
secondary effects of making public transportation and other government-managed services more 
economically viable.  Today, over 8,000 residents live in Kentlands and Lakelands, while 
commercial and office space totals approximately 93,000 sqm (1,000,000 square feet).   
 
 
 
Of important note is the Kentlands Community Foundation, a non-profit, resident-run 
organization serving the greater purpose of the development.  The Foundation has a three-
pronged mission, represented by the three subgroups of The New Urbanist Committee; The Arts 
& Culture Committee; and The Volunteer & Community Outreach Committee.  When Kentlands’ 
governing covenants were drawn up, the Kentlands homeowner's association (“Citizens 
Assembly”) was set up to manage the governmental and administrative duties of the community.  
Kentlands Community Foundation is a totally separate entity from the Citizens Assembly.   The 
Foundation was created to assume leadership for the broader cultural and social mission of the 
development, while fostering community spirit and activity in Kentlands and its neighboring 
towns.  The Foundation's oversight is comprised of a Board of Directors, which oversees its 
Kentlands’ diversity in housing types 
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activities and policies.  Members hail from the Gaithersburg/Montgomery County government; 
business, arts, and town planning communities; and general population of Kentlands and 
Lakelands. 
 
Although the City of Gaithersburg owns and maintains Kentlands’ historical sites, the 
Foundation helps promote and support those landmarks:  “The City's renovation of the mansion 
and barn into cultural facilities realized a key component of the Kentlands plan in that the arts 
would be an integral part of community life.  The Kentlands Mansion serves as a rental facility 
and art gallery, hosting weddings, parties and business events.  In the Gaithersburg Arts Barn 
today, former horse stalls house artist studios and a 99-seat theater occupies the upper floor 
where Mr. Kent once held dances.  The Firehouse awaits renovation.  The Carriage House that 
once housed Mr. Kent's automobile collection is now a community facility owned by the 
Kentlands Citizens Assembly.  The brick building provides space for meetings, classes and an 
office for the Kentlands Community Foundation.” 
 
As with Miasteczko Wilanόw, Kentlands began with a residential focus both with its planning 
and its phasing.  Although residential building has long been finished, commercial development 
continues to undergo some construction.  For the most part, this is in the form of refocusing 
existing buildings for new uses.  In the last several years, Kentlands city authorities hired 
architecture and design advisory firm HOK International to further intensify the mixed-use and 
transit-oriented nature of its downtown commercial district.  This underscores the flexibility of a 
new urbanist community: although technological advancements and generational preferences 
may demand new retail and office space layouts, the core of the community remains intact and 
only minor tweaking is necessary to regain optimal financial and strategic performance.  
Conversely, single-use districts typically require costly and extensive redevelopments when 
faced with exogenous shifts. 
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6.2 The Pinehills, Massachusetts, USA 
The Pinehills is the newest large-scale master planned community in New England.  It is located 
in Plymouth, Massachusetts, approximately 45 miles southeast of Boston and of nearly equal 
distance to the easternmost resort communities of Cape Cod.  Although Pinehills was not 
planned with the specific intention of being a new urbanist development, it utilizes many of the 
characteristics of the design movement.  The entire land parcel making up Pinehills measures 
1,270 hectares (3,174 acres) of hilly, heavily-wooded terrain.  Even before its ground-breaking, 
the lead developers had the intention of preserving a vast majority of the site and working new 
construction as best as possible into the difficult topography and natural features of the land.  To 
date, the developers of Pinehills have set aside over 2,000 acres, or 70% of its total area, as open 
space.  Meanwhile, the developers have pursued a higher-density, mixed-use development plan 
that creates a compact, highly-social living environment while largely restricting residential 
buildings to two-stories. 
 
 
 
A brief overview of land parcel’s history provides important insights into the unique 
characteristics and considerable challenges in settling this area.  The topography of The Pinehills 
was formed in the last Ice Age, when glaciers carved a massive valley out of the terrain.  In its 
wake, sandy soil and boulders were left behind making the land inarable for the Native American 
tribes that roamed this area for centuries.  The settlement of Plymouth in 1620 and subsequent 
growth of the Massachusetts Bay Colony brought little change for The Pinehills plot.  Historians 
note two early-American landmarks within the area: Old Sandwich Road, a native trail that was 
turned into a road by the colonists, and Cornish Tavern, a historic watering hole found along the 
route.  Starting in 1891, thread manufacturer Robert Symington began assembling parcels that 
The Pinehills’ location relative to Boston and Cape Cod, MA 
90 
 
would eventually become The Pinehills as his family’s hunting grounds.  In fact, Symington’s 
estate, The Pines, today makes up the core of the development.  In 1968, the plot was sold to 
John Talcott, a Connecticut-based investor.  In 1986, Talcott sold the land intact to Digital 
Equipment Corporation, which considered building an office campus on the site.  The land was 
largely untouched until 1999 when four developers – Tony Green of The Green Companies; Tom 
Wallace of Wallace Associates and Steve Karp and Steve Fischman of New England 
Development – teamed up to purchase the land for a new residential community. 
 
It took five years for the new owners to secure planning and building permits with the state and 
local authorizes that preserves open spaces while allowing the development of a unique high-
density suburban community in a forest setting.  In one of their first actions, the developers 
invested several tens of millions dollars in piping to draw water from the other side of the 
adjacent Route 3 highway.  The Pinehills couldn’t tap into the existing Old Plymouth water 
system for reasons including distance, topography, and ancillary impacts to the community.  
Plymouth residents viewed this very positively since their water source and filtration plant was 
already at maximum capacity.  With the infrastructure backbone in place, the landowners began 
to sell smaller parcels to other builders.   
 
 
The Pinehills’ – variety in housing types 
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To date, nine different construction companies have been used to build out The Pinehills, all 
under the parameters laid out by The Green Companies’ original master plan.  The community is 
expected to be completed in the next four years, and will have close to 3,000 homes in luxury 
houses, apartments, and condominiums.  Although the development is predominantly residential-
focused, a plentitude of mixed-use offerings have been worked into the site.  The center of the 
community, the Village Green, will have roughly 120,000 sqm (1.3 million square feet) of 
commercial and retail space at completion; today it is the main gathering place for residents with 
its upscale grocery store, other small retailers, post office, restaurant, wine and spirits shop, bank 
branch, and medical and professional offices.  The Pinehills also has two 18-hole championship 
golf courses – designed by Rees Jones and Jack Nicklaus, respectively – that consistently gain 
national accolades for quality of play.  Additionally, the community has seven miles of walking 
trails, where residents can often be seen hiking, dog-walking, and horse-riding.  Furthermore, 
there is a kiddie splash pool and an outdoor swimming pool within The Pinehills, offering 
additional recreational outlets for families.          
The Pinehills’ – variety in housing types 
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The development of The Pinehills has been a resounding economic success for both the builders 
involved and the Town of Plymouth.  For one thing, house prices did not dip during the severe 
real estate crisis that began in 2007, although the rate of home sales did wane somewhat.  
Additionally, the new residents have been a boon for Plymouth, a municipality which was 
previously stressed by budget shortfalls.  The Pinehills served to raise the average price of homes 
in the town by over 100% since its inception.  Plymouth was considered a forgotten New 
England town before Pinehills; since then, Old Plymouth has since experienced an influx of new 
home buyers desiring historical properties that can be rebuilt and refurbished to modern 
specifications.  The tax base and collections of the Town of Plymouth have increased 
dramatically, while the impact on Old Plymouth local services has been extremely limited.  The 
Pinehills is not a senior community by any stretch of the imagination, but it is strongly 
comprised of a demographic of older wage-earners and smaller business-owners.  The average 
age of Pinehills is 53 and as a result of very few children live at Pinehills, there has been little 
impact on Plymouth’s public schools.  The development is largely self-patrolled and self-
regulated so few additional law enforcement officers have been added in the town.  Finally, the 
entrance to the community is right next to a major state highway, so Pinehills has not caused a 
material amount of additional traffic within the existing municipality. 
  
The Pinehills - The Green (left) and The Market (right) 
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Chapter 7   Conclusion: Recommendations & Solutions 
The entrepreneurial prowess of K.R. and strong leadership of Zbigniew Okoński and Guy Perry 
guided Miasteczko Wilanόw through the planning, investment, and development stages for the 
greater part of a decade.  In particular, the establishment of a master plan based on the principles 
of New Urbanism set the tone and rhythm of the future community early on.  Great strides have 
been made towards producing the original vision of an integrated mixed-use development, 
despite the many challenges that have been encountered over the past decade.  While Miasteczko 
is still six to eight years away from completion and continues to lack a number of necessary 
elements today, there is already a semblance and coherence to the neighborhood.  As for its 
resident population, Miasteczko Wilanόw has grown well into the working democracy its 
original designers intended it to be. 
 
With its own history as the precedent, and Kentlands and The Pinehills as its comparables, there 
are several recommendations that could be offered for future developers of large-scale mixed-use 
developments in the emerging market context.  While these are by no means exhaustive and each 
one could perhaps be expanded into a study of its own, they are meant to be both serious 
considerations and starting points. 
 
Upfront Infrastructure Guarantees 
The Pinehills shows that in certain cases, the development of new large-scale projects will 
require that the initial investors assume tremendous upfront costs for infrastructure 
improvements to make a well-positioned, but underserved land parcel viable.  By constructing its 
own water supply and wastewater treatment faculties, The Green Companies was reliant solely 
on itself for the speed and phasing of various real estate types.  Conversely, the completion of 
important roads and public spaces in Miasteczko were delayed numerous times, sometimes for 
years, by the uncertainty of public works funding and timing.  In fact, many times the ongoing 
disputes were used as a means for the various Wilanόw parties to gain leverage on one another.  
While it would seem on the surface that only the residents and small business owners in 
Miasteczko suffered from the infighting and foot-dragging, that is not entirely true.  Developers 
certainly were impacted by their time-to-market (real returns) and their ability to reinvest profits 
in new parts of the development (phasing flexibility).  Additionally, in long-term development 
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projects such as Miasteczko, Kentlands, and Pinehills, capitalizing on an open and active real 
estate market could mean the difference between success and failure.  The onset of the financial 
crisis in 2007 proved this to be the case for many developers globally; there is an operating 
leverage inherent in real estate development that works against builders until the project is 
delivered.   It would have served Miasteczko well to simply assume the infrastructure 
improvements into the initial purchase figures and then pass along the added costs as best as 
possible to subsequent construction partners.  One could argue that the shortfalls in nominal 
payback could be justified in a quicker payback period and the certainty of selling into a market 
of known quantity. 
 
Phasing from the Downtown Out 
Miasteczko would have also benefitted if its phasing started at the town center; expanded to 
encompass public squares, green spaces, and community facilities; continued through to 
residential and retail building; and concluded with office construction.  In some sense, Prokom 
did try to pursue this strategy by locking in Deniz and Auchan as building partners in the town 
hall and outdoor shopping plaza areas early on; however, circumstances dictated otherwise.  In 
the case of Kentlands, the downtown was vital to producing the community that the local 
Gaithersburg residents desired.  In fact, the original project expanded into Lakelands so that a 
bigger town center, with more shops and services, could be built.   
 
Meanwhile, Miasteczko has survived, and even expanded its housing stock over the past several 
years, despite its lack of a town center and limited retail offerings.  This can only be attributed to 
the lack of better alternatives (competition) in Warsaw.  If Kentland and/or Pinehills were phased 
in over a similar timeframe, those developments would have been shunned long ago by potential 
new buyers in favor of other projects in the Washington D.C. and Boston areas.  Going forward, 
it is important for developers to note that as certain emerging markets develop and an increasing 
amount of decent options are presented to buyers, haphazard phasing could doom their projects.  
This does not mean to ignore the fact that Miasteczko is a unique project with few, if any, 
comparables.  However, some of its builders, including Polnord, Robyg and Fadesa, are already 
in search of new greenfield sites for a second wave of new urbanist developments in Warsaw.  In 
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the extreme case, this would mean that differentiation between their new projects – should they 
all come online at the same time - could come down to phasing execution. 
 
A Homeowners Charter 
The existence of a homeowners’ charter that effectively established a local government has 
helped Kentlands tremendously with maintaining and improving its neighborhood.  Rather than 
relying on the incumbent municipal government of Gaithersburg Maryland, Kentlands had 
already drawn up a representative body for the community’s residents before groundbreaking.  It 
would aid the roll-out of future large-scale mixed-use developments if a similar format were 
replicated.  If nothing more, the charter would provide a sort of audit and hold the various 
developers accountable for their promises to the many stakeholders in new developments. 
 
Gifting a Foundation 
The final recommendation involves the establishment of a non-profit organization to oversee, 
promote, and help fund the well-being of new urbanist communities such as Miasteczko and 
Kentlands.  In the case of Miasteczko, land swaps with the church (for the temple site) were used 
to gain an important local partner to assist in gaining zoning changes and building permits.  In 
the case of Kentlands, historical and important cultural landmarks were gifted to the city of 
Gaithersburg to secure accelerated government approvals.  It would be wise for future developers 
of large-scale, mixed-use projects to consider similar measures, not only to gain expedited 
approvals from local authorities, but to foster a greater sense of community between their future 
residents.  By creating a foundation, new urbanist developers could at least be assured that the 
original intentions and vision of the development would be supported and promoted by an 
independent body for future generations.  Of course, such an organization needs some measure 
of authority and capital funding to be a legitimate force.  Thus, it is recommended that the lead 
developers consider gifting certain lands, perhaps those set aside for future private schools or 
other non-commercial endeavors, to such a foundation.  The compensation could come from 
tangible tax write-offs or intangible positive marketing.  In any case, the community will be well 
served by having land parcels for necessary facilities set aside and controlled by an independent 
organization.  The proceeds will then fund the organization for future benevolent actions, 
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including citizens’ action as in the case of Miasteczko or educational grants as in the case of 
Kentlands. 
 
As a review of the successes and failures of large-scale new urbanist developments, the 
comparative table below is offered as a means of assessing different projects side-by-side on six 
chief grading criteria.  Although these criteria are by no means exhaustive, they seek to capture 
the key drivers behind such mixed-use developments.  A brief definition of each follows: 
Public Realm: does the development mesh various real estate product types effectively while 
respecting the local ecology and its location-specific historical/cultural features? 
Profitability: have the various construction projects in the development provided attractive 
returns to its initial and secondary investors? 
Standard of Living: does the development provide a better quality of life for its residents and 
local workforce in terms of health benefits, diversity of amenities, community offerings, etc.? 
Community Leadership: does the development have a strong centralized body of representatives 
working to preserve and promote the ideals and vision of the community? 
Public-Private Cooperation: to what degree do the local government and community 
stakeholders work in tandem to satisfy social, infrastructural, and maintenance needs of the 
locale? 
Public Service Infrastructure:  to what degree is the development served on-site by public 
schools, medical facilities, senior services, etc?  Additionally, are roads and public transportation 
options adequate to provide local stakeholders easy access into and out of the development? 
 
 
Miasteczko Wilanόw Kentlands & Lakelands, MD The Pinehills, MA
Location Warsaw, Poland.  Urban setting.  
Approximately 8 kilometers  (5 miles) south 
of the city center.
Gaithersberg, MD.  Suburban setting.  
Roughly 20 miles northwest of downtown 
Washington D.C.
Plymouth, MA.  Suburban setting, 45 miles 
southeast of Boston.
Size of Property 169 hectares total (422 acres total).  Roughly 
one-third dedicated to planned and 
landscaped public parks, squares, and green 
spaces.
352 acres total. 3,174 acres total, of which 2,000 acres 
preserved as woodlands.  
Development 
Specifics
2,000,000 square meters of build space and 
over 15,000 residents planned at completion.
More than 8,000 residents.  Roughly 
1,000,000 square feet in office and 
commercial space.
3,000 residences across homes, apartments, 
and condos.  1.3 million square feet of retail 
& commercial space.
Year Initiated & 
Completed
Groundbreaking in 2001.  Estimated 
completion around 2018.
Groundbreaking of Kentlands in 1989.  
Completion of Lakelands around 2002.
Groundbreaking in 2004.  Estimated 
completion in 2015.
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n
s 
gr
o
u
ps
 
an
d 
el
ec
tio
n
 
o
f 
lo
ca
l r
es
id
en
ts
 
to
 
di
st
ric
t c
o
u
n
ci
l p
o
si
tio
n
s 
ha
v
e 
tu
rn
ed
 
ar
o
u
n
d 
si
tu
at
io
n
.
Th
e 
ea
rly
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f t
he
 
K
en
tla
n
ds
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
 
pr
o
m
o
te
s 
an
d 
pr
es
er
v
es
 
th
e 
id
ea
ls
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
by
 
th
e 
de
v
el
o
pe
rs
, 
de
si
gn
er
s,
 
an
d 
pl
an
n
er
s.
Ce
n
tr
al
ize
d 
w
eb
si
te
 
fo
r 
re
si
de
n
ts
, 
bu
t l
ar
ge
ly
 
u
n
st
ru
ct
u
re
d 
o
rg
an
iza
tio
n
.
 
 
Le
ad
 
de
v
el
o
pe
rs
 
re
m
ai
n
 
at
 
th
e 
fo
re
fro
n
t o
f c
o
m
m
u
n
ity
 
ev
en
ts
.
5.
 
Pu
bl
ic-
Pr
iv
a
te
 
Co
o
pe
ra
tio
n
A
 
ch
al
le
n
ge
 
fo
r 
m
an
y 
ye
ar
s 
du
e 
to
 
se
lf-
in
te
re
st
ed
 
de
v
el
o
pe
rs
 
an
d 
an
 
u
n
de
rfu
n
de
d 
to
w
n
 
bu
dg
et
.
 
 
Lo
ca
l 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t s
til
l r
eq
u
ire
s 
pr
es
su
re
 
to
 
fu
lfi
ll 
pu
bl
ic
 
sp
ac
e 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
du
tie
s.
St
ro
n
g 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
fo
u
n
de
d 
fro
m
 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 
ch
ar
et
te
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
lo
ca
l r
es
id
en
ts
, 
co
m
m
u
n
ity
 
le
ad
er
s,
 
ar
ch
ite
ct
s,
 
an
d 
de
v
el
o
pe
rs
.
 
 
A
ct
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
sh
ar
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n
 
re
gi
o
n
al
/c
o
m
m
u
n
ity
 
au
th
o
rit
ie
s.
La
rg
el
y 
de
v
el
o
pe
d 
to
 
be
 
in
de
pe
n
de
n
t f
ro
m
 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
Pl
ym
o
u
th
, 
M
A
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
.
 
 
A
s 
a 
re
su
lt,
 
n
ea
rly
 
al
l c
o
re
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
w
as
 
pl
an
n
ed
 
an
d 
fu
n
de
d 
by
 
pr
iv
at
e 
in
v
es
to
rs
.
6.
 
Pu
bl
ic 
Se
rv
ic
e
s 
In
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
Ro
ad
s 
an
d 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
o
f p
u
bl
ic
 
gr
ee
n
 
sp
ac
es
 
se
v
er
el
y 
la
ck
in
g 
be
fo
re
 
20
10
; i
m
pr
o
v
ed
 
si
n
ce
 
U
LI
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
.
 
 
La
ck
 
o
f s
ch
o
o
ls
 
an
 
is
su
e.
 
 
H
o
sp
ita
l o
n
-
si
te
.
 
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 
(bu
se
s) 
o
n
 
m
ai
n
 
bo
u
le
v
ar
ds
.
Ex
ce
lle
n
t. 
 
Sc
ho
o
ls
 
o
n
-
si
te
 
an
d 
am
pl
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
 
o
pt
io
n
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
th
ro
u
gh
o
u
t t
he
 
de
v
el
o
pm
en
t.
N
o
 
sc
ho
o
ls
 
o
n
-
si
te
, 
al
th
o
u
gh
 
th
e 
co
m
m
u
n
ity
 
ha
s 
a 
v
er
y 
lo
w
 
ch
il 
po
pu
la
tio
n
.
 
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 
o
ffi
ce
s 
o
n
-
si
te
.
 
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
 
o
pt
io
n
s 
ar
e 
v
er
y 
lim
ite
d 
-
 
re
si
de
n
ts
 
re
lia
n
t o
n
 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
v
eh
ic
le
s.
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